Aller au contenu principal

ÉTAT MONDIAL DE LA DÉMOCRATIE – IDEA 2022 – LE RAPPORT COMPLET – EROSION (MISE A JOUR)

ILLUSTRATION : VOIR LA COURBE DE LA FRANCE

Les analyses 2022 de l’Institut international pour la démocratie et l’assistance électorale (IDEA), basé à Stockholm

Créé en 1995, IDEA, l’Institut international pour la démocratie et l’assistance électorale, est une organisation intergouvernementale comprenant des États membres de tous les continents, il a pour mission de promouvoir la démocratie durable dans le monde.

Près de la moitié des démocraties du monde sont en déclin, alors que les régimes autoritaires sont chaque fois plus répressifs, selon l’Institut international pour la démocratie et l’assistance électorale (IDEA), basé à Stockholm.

Dans son plus récent rapport, IDEA évalue que sur les 104 démocraties du monde, 48 sont en contraction, puisqu’elles ont enregistré des reculs sur plusieurs aspects. Seules 14 sont en expansion, c’est-à-dire qu’on y a enregistré des améliorations relativement aux indicateurs clés.

Au cours des cinq dernières années, le nombre de pays en forte érosion démocratique a atteint un sommet. Entre 2016 et 2021, le nombre de pays évoluant vers l’autoritarisme représentait plus du double du nombre de ceux évoluant vers la démocratie.

L’adhésion à l’idée d’un leader fort qui ne s’embarrasse pas d’un Parlement et d’élections est en augmentation

L’Enquête mondiale sur les valeurs (World Values Survey), citée dans le rapport, montre que le nombre de personnes appuyant un leader fort qui ne s’embarrasse pas d’un Parlement et d’élections est en augmentation. En 2009, 38 % des personnes interrogées trouvaient que c’était une bonne chose, et elles étaient 52 % en 2021.

En Europe, la qualité de la démocratie a stagné ou s’est détériorée dans plusieurs pays. Dans 17 pays, qui représentent 43 % des démocraties européennes, la démocratie s’est dégradée au cours des cinq dernières années.

Rénover les contrats sociaux

Il y a urgence à agir pour sauver les régimes démocratiques, explique le rapport, la priorité devant être accordée à « la mise en oeuvre et à l’application de stratégies et de politiques qui réduisent la corruption et rétablissent la confiance du public », pour rénover les contrats sociaux. « Notre capacité collective à nous rassembler, localement et internationalement, pour poursuivre la conception citoyenne de ces contrats déterminera le sort de la démocratie dans les années à venir »,

EXTRAITS DU RAPPORT : 

« Ce rapport reprendra l’argument selon lequel c’est la démocratie, plutôt que les inventions du XXIe siècle telles que l’autocratie électorale ou la démocratie illiberalle qui fournit les outils nécessaires pour résoudre les problèmes urgents d’aujourd’hui.

« La récente série de crises mondiales, y compris l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine et les conflits en Éthiopie, au Myanmar, en Syrie et au Yémen, et leurs effets d’entraînement, semblent indiquer l’émergence d’un nouveau statu quo, défini par une volatilité et une incertitude radicales, plutôt qu’un déviation par rapport aux tendances historiques antérieures.

« Les sondages d’opinion mondiaux montrent que cette période a coïncidé avec une baisse de la confiance du public dans la valeur de la démocratie elle-même. C’est extrêmement inquiétant pour ceux qui se soucient du sort de la démocratie, mais malheureusement pas surprenant. 

« Le cœur de tout contrat social est que les citoyens consentent à être gouvernés en échange de certains biens essentiels fournis par ceux qui gouvernent. Pourtant, la capacité des démocraties du monde entier à fournir des biens publics essentiels à leurs citoyens et à combler l‘écart entre les attentes sociales et les performances institutionnelles est de plus en plus menacée. 

« Les contrats sociaux sont des accords implicites sur ce que les gouvernements fournissent à leurs citoyens en échange d’une légitimité publique. Ils reflètent une compréhension de la façon dont les gens résolvent des problèmes communs, gèrent les risques et mettent en commun les ressources pour fournir des biens publics, ainsi que le fonctionnement de leurs institutions et normes collectives.

« Les contrats sociaux varient en fonction du contexte culturel et historique, mais toutes les démocraties partagent certains points communs fondamentaux, notamment le respect des droits civils et politiques individuels, des élections équitables et compétitives, un exercice raisonnablement égal du pouvoir par les gouvernés sur leur gouvernement et un accès effectif à un ensemble de droits qui rendent possible une vie digne et pleine de sens. Il y a maintenant une prise de conscience populaire croissante que de nombreux contrats sociaux dans le monde ne sont plus adaptés à leur objectif.

« La démocratie a les meilleures chances de forger des contrats sociaux pour le XXIe siècle, capables de relever les défis du futur, en particulier la tâche diaboliquement difficile de protéger les droits fondamentaux et les équilibres écologiques dont dépendent l’avenir de ces droits et de la vie humaine. 

« La démocratie doit être revigorée, non pas parce qu’elle doit prévaloir dans une nouvelle ère présumée de guerre froide, mais parce qu’elle offre toujours la meilleure chance de préserver ce qui est nécessaire (et précieux) à la vie humaine. C’est la véritable mesure du succès des démocraties et des sociétés d’aujourd’hui.

« Une grande partie du rapport se concentre sur la place centrale de la démocratie dans la garantie d’un avenir durable et juste, et sur le fait qu’un tel avenir n’est pas prédestiné mais doit être mérité

« Il estnécessaire de développer de nouveaux contrats sociaux innovants qui reflètent mieux l’évolution de l’environnement mondial et qui accordent une priorité significative à l’égalité d’accès aux mécanismes de participation.

« Au cours des cinq dernières années, les progrès ont stagné pour les quatre attributs agrégés des indices de l’état mondial de la démocratie (indices GSoD). Dans certains cas, les scores sont les mêmes qu’en 1990.

« La stagnation existe parallèlement au déclin démocratique ailleurs. Le nombre de pays en recul (sept) reste à son apogée, et le nombre de pays évoluant vers l’autoritarisme est plus du double du nombre évoluant vers la démocratie. À la fin de 2021, près d’un tiers des 173 pays évalués par International IDEA connaissent une baisse d’au moins un sous-attribut de la démocratie.

« La proportion de personnes qui sont d’accord avec l’idée qu’avoir un leader fort qui n’a pas à se soucier du parlement ou des élections n’a cessé d’augmenter ces dernières années. En 2009, le World Values ​​Survey a rapporté que seulement 38 % des personnes interrogées pensaient que cette idée était assez bonne ou très bonne. En 2021, ce chiffre était passé à 52 %

VOIR – POUR LA FRANCE – LES PUBLICATIONS ANTERIEURES :

DEMOCRATIE FRANCAISE : LE RAPPORT 2020 D’IDEA CONSTITUAIT DEJA UNE ALERTE – Partie 5 – https://metahodos.fr/2021/11/28/democratie-francaise-le-rapport-2020-dideat-constituait-deja-une-alerte/

La France confirme son statut de «démocratie défaillante» – DEMOCRATY INDEX 2021 (Partie 1) https://metahodos.fr/2022/02/13/la-france-confirme-son-statut-de-democraties-defaillante/

Les pays qui prennent des mesures inquiétantes pour la démocratie…Et la France ? https://metahodos.fr/2020/12/13/de-nombreux-pays-prennent-des-mesures-inquietantes-pour-la-democratie/

La France classée entre 24, 29 et 37° – Peut-on mesurer la démocratie? https://metahodos.fr/2020/09/03/suite-la-france-classee-entre-24-29-et-37-peut-on-mesurer-la-democratie/

POURQUOI LA FRANCE EST UNE DEMOCRATIE DEFAILLANTE DEPUIS 2019 ? (Partie 4). https://metahodos.fr/2022/02/16/pourquoi-la-france-est-depuis-2020-une-democratie-defaillante-partie-4/

La France classée 24e, 29e ou 37ème pour sa démocratie et sa gouvernance https://metahodos.fr/2020/08/30/la-france-classee-24eme-29eme-ou-37eme-pour-sa-democratie-et-sa-gouvernance/

CLASSEMENTS/DECLASSEMENTS DEMOCRATIQUES – DEMOCRATY INDEX (partie 3) https://metahodos.fr/2022/02/14/classements-et-declassements-democratiques/

ETAT DE DROIT (23) WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX 2021 – « WHICH NATIONS DO BEST AT PROVIDING RULE OF LAW WHY IT MATTERS » https://metahodos.fr/2022/02/03/23/

RAPPORT COMPLET

L’état mondial de la démocratie 2022 : Forger des contrats sociaux en période de mécontentement

Contenu

Préface

Remerciements

Introduction

Chapitre 1 – Tendances mondiales

1.1 Modèles globaux

Chapitre 2 – Tendances régionales

2.1 Afrique et Asie occidentale

2.2 Asie et Pacifique

2.3 Europe

2.4 Les Amériques

Chapitre 3 – Recommandations

3.1 Recommandations globales

3.2 Recommandations régionales

Chapitre 4 – Conclusions

À propos d’International IDEA

À propos de l’Initiative sur l’état mondial de la démocratie

Préface

La quatrième édition du Rapport sur l’état mondial de la démocratie arrive à un moment où la démocratie est attaquée à la fois au sens propre et au sens figuré dans le monde entier. Le battement de tambour régulier de ces avertissements – inclus dans l’édition précédente de ce rapport, qui a été produit au plus fort de la pandémie de Covid-19 – risque toujours de devenir un bruit de fond, car la crise d’aujourd’hui peut rapidement devenir la nouvelle norme de demain. Mais les dangers sont réels. Au-delà de la pandémie persistante, des guerres d’aujourd’hui et d’une récession mondiale imminente, se trouve le défi du changement climatique et tout ce qu’il implique : événements météorologiques violents, transition verte nécessaire et conséquences multiples pour la gouvernance démocratique.

Beaucoup de choses ont changé depuis qu’International IDEA a publié son premier rapport sur l’état mondial de la démocratie en 2017, rédigé à la veille du Brexit et peu après l’élection de Donald Trump. Ce rapport mélangeait un optimisme prudent quant aux progrès de la démocratie des décennies précédentes avec des avertissements concernant des « fluctuations sans tendance » plus récentes – une stagnation de la démocratie plutôt que son érosion. Cela témoigne de la façon dont les chocs politiques peuvent rapidement réorienter notre réflexion. Ce rapport reprendra une fois de plus l’argument selon lequel c’est la démocratie, plutôt que les inventions du XXIe siècle telles que l’autocratie électorale ou la démocratie illibérale – sans parler de la résurrection du revanchisme impérial et des sphères d’influence du XIXe siècle – qui fournit les outils nécessaires pour résoudre les problèmes urgents d’aujourd’hui.

La récente série de crises mondiales, y compris l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine et les conflits en Éthiopie, au Myanmar, en Syrie et au Yémen, et leurs effets d’entraînement, semblent indiquer l’émergence d’un nouveau statu quo, défini par une volatilité et une incertitude radicales, plutôt qu’un déviation par rapport aux tendances historiques antérieures.

Les sondages d’opinion mondiaux montrent que cette période a coïncidé avec une baisse de la confiance du public dans la valeur de la démocratie elle-même. C’est extrêmement inquiétant pour ceux qui se soucient du sort de la démocratie, mais malheureusement pas surprenant. Le cœur de tout contrat social est que les citoyens consentent à être gouvernés en échange de certains biens essentiels fournis par ceux qui gouvernent. Pourtant, la capacité des démocraties du monde entier à fournir des biens publics essentiels à leurs citoyens et à combler l’écart entre les attentes sociales et les performances institutionnelles est de plus en plus menacée. Ces questions troublantes étaient présentes bien avant que les démocraties n’aient à s’attaquer aux inégalités grotesques au sein et entre les pays exposées par la pandémie, et à l’inflation, aux pénuries et aux menaces de ralentissement économique mondial qui ont suivi.

Mais contrairement à ce que les pessimistes démocrates peuvent suggérer, les pays autoritaires et les systèmes de gouvernement alternatifs n’ont pas surpassé leurs homologues démocratiques. Le mécontentement face au flot incessant de blocages chinois et les dizaines de milliers de réfractaires fuyant la Russie pour une existence incertaine dans le Caucase du Sud et l’Asie centrale montrent que ce n’est pas seulement dans les démocraties où le contrat social a un besoin urgent de renouvellement.

Les contrats sociaux varient en fonction du contexte culturel et historique, mais toutes les démocraties partagent certains points communs fondamentaux, notamment le respect des droits civils et politiques individuels, des élections équitables et compétitives, un exercice raisonnablement égal du pouvoir par les gouvernés sur leur gouvernement et un accès effectif à un ensemble de droits qui rendent possible une vie digne et pleine de sens. Il y a maintenant une prise de conscience populaire croissante que de nombreux contrats sociaux dans le monde ne sont plus adaptés à leur objectif.

Dans certains États, les gouvernements et leurs citoyens renégocient ces contrats sociaux. Par exemple, le soulèvement collectif contre le gouvernement déchu de Rajapaksa au Sri Lanka a bouleversé les clivages ethniques et sociopolitiques antérieurs. Mais ce n’est pas un processus simple, comme l’a démontré le rejet du nouveau projet de constitution du Chili.

Dans des endroits aussi variés qu’El Salvador, la Hongrie, l’Iran et le Myanmar, les élites dirigeantes tentent de forger de nouveaux ou de revigorer d’anciens contrats sociaux en utilisant divers moyens antidémocratiques. L’Iran et le Myanmar sont des régimes autoritaires en quête d’auto-préservation. Parfois, nous nous référons à des pays comme El Salvador et la Hongrie en les qualifiant de « rétrogrades », un terme qui ne doit pas toujours être interprété comme signifiant un retour net à une ère pré-démocratique antérieure ; cela peut aussi marquer une évolution vers une nouvelle forme de politique anti-démocratique. Nous n’avançons pas en avant et en arrière le long d’une seule ligne de développement, mais explorons divers résultats politiques possibles alors que les autocraties et les démocraties contestent notre avenir possible.

La démocratie a les meilleures chances de forger des contrats sociaux pour le XXIe siècle, capables de relever les défis du futur, en particulier la tâche diaboliquement difficile de protéger les droits fondamentaux et les équilibres écologiques dont dépendent l’avenir de ces droits et de la vie humaine. La démocratie doit être revigorée, non pas parce qu’elle doit prévaloir dans une nouvelle ère présumée de guerre froide, mais parce qu’elle offre toujours la meilleure chance de préserver ce qui est nécessaire (et précieux) à la vie humaine. C’est la véritable mesure du succès des démocraties et des sociétés d’aujourd’hui.

Nous sommes fiers de présenter ce rapport dans le cadre de la contribution d’International IDEA au débat mondial sur le sort et le cours de la démocratie. Une grande partie du rapport se concentre sur la place centrale de la démocratie dans la garantie d’un avenir durable et juste, et sur le fait qu’un tel avenir n’est pas prédestiné mais doit être mérité. Dans de nombreux endroits, il est gagné de la manière la plus difficile. Il y a ceux qui, en ce moment, réclament les droits et les libertés que la démocratie promet à d’immenses risques personnels. Le peuple ukrainien résiste à la brutale invasion russe, les Iraniennes résistent à une dictature théocratique de 40 ans et le peuple du Myanmar refuse d’accepter un retour au régime militaire. Ils prouvent sans l’ombre d’un doute que l’autodétermination, la liberté et la démocratie sont des aspirations universelles. Beaucoup d’entre eux paient le prix ultime de ces aspirations. Beaucoup d’entre eux n’auront d’autre tombe que notre mémoire. Nous leur devons de nous souvenir de leurs luttes chaque jour, d’apporter notre soutien indéfectible à leur cause et de rendre notre travail digne de leur sacrifice.

Kevin Casas-Zamora
Secrétaire général, International IDEA

Remerciements

Ce rapport a été conceptualisé et rédigé par l’équipe d’évaluation de la démocratie d’International IDEA, avec des contributions des programmes régionaux Europe, Afrique et Asie occidentale, Amériques et Asie et Pacifique. Il a été produit sous la supervision de Kevin Casas-Zamora, Massimo Tommasoli et Seema Shah et édité par Alistair Scrutton et Seema Shah. Alexander Hudson et Emily Bloom ont produit tous les graphiques du rapport. Lisa Hagman a supervisé le processus de production de la publication. Un grand merci à Katherine Chapanionek, Sandor Adam Gorni et Theodor Thisell pour leur aide inestimable dans la vérification des faits, l’édition des lignes et la production de graphiques. 
Malgré tous les conseils généreux, l’aide et les commentaires reçus de partenaires externes, International IDEA assume l’entière responsabilité du contenu de ce rapport.

Introduction

À la fin de 2022, le monde est piégé sous le poids d’une multitude de problèmes anciens et nouveaux. Il existe une myriade de causes d’instabilité politique et économique, notamment la flambée des prix des denrées alimentaires et de l’énergie, la flambée de l’inflation et une récession imminente. Ces phénomènes se produisent dans un contexte instable de changement climatique persistant, d’inégalités longtemps non résolues, de pandémie de Covid-19, de baisse du niveau de vie ( 1 ) et de guerre d’agression russe en Ukraine. Les hypothèses de longue date ont été ébranlées; les récits post-vérité ont mis en péril la légitimité de processus électoraux crédibles ; et la guerre interétatique, y compris la menace d’attaques nucléaires, a refait surface.

Fait inquiétant, le nombre de personnes qui croient que la démocratie est la réponse à ces problèmes diminue. Les dernières conclusions de Global State of Democracy révèlent un déclin et une stagnation de la démocratie dans le monde. Un examen attentif des données révèle que si de nombreuses démocraties ont mis en place les lois et l’infrastructure nécessaires pour soutenir les institutions démocratiques, l’inégalité d’accès à ces institutions est un problème grave et persistant.
Les institutions démocratiques sont particulièrement essentielles en temps de crise et de peur. Ils garantissent des voies ouvertes pour l’information et la communication dont les citoyens et les gouvernements ont besoin pour pouvoir agir de manière réactive et efficace. Pour reconstruire et revitaliser ces institutions et rétablir la confiance entre les peuples et leurs gouvernements, il est nécessaire de développer de nouveaux contrats sociaux innovants qui reflètent mieux l’évolution de l’environnement mondial et qui accordent une priorité significative à l’égalité d’accès aux mécanismes de participation.

Encadré 1 – Qu’est-ce qu’un contrat social ?

Les contrats sociaux sont des accords implicites sur ce que les gouvernements fournissent à leurs citoyens en échange d’une légitimité publique. Ils reflètent une compréhension de la façon dont les gens résolvent des problèmes communs, gèrent les risques et mettent en commun les ressources pour fournir des biens publics, ainsi que le fonctionnement de leurs institutions et normes collectives. ( 2 ) Le type de contrat social qui sous-tendait une grande partie de l’expansion de la démocratie après la guerre froide est maintenant mis à rude épreuve, et les gouvernements et leurs citoyens doivent renégocier les termes de leurs relations. Les besoins des gens ont évolué; une sécurité économique et sociale de base est toujours requise, mais de nouveaux défis ont suscité une demande de différents types de garanties de la part de l’État.

Par exemple, les systèmes d’éducation, de protection sociale et de croissance professionnelle doivent s’adapter aux nouveaux besoins introduits par l’évolution des modes de travail, les différents types d’emploi et les nouvelles technologies, et reconnaître l’importance de l’économie des soins et des multiples formes d’inégalité ( 3 ). Dans un contexte mondial interconnecté ( 4 ), les contrats sociaux doivent être tournés vers l’avenir pour intégrer les protections contre les menaces de demain.

Les contrats sociaux renouvelés doivent également être fondés sur l’équité. Il ne suffit plus que l’État offre des opportunités ; il doit concevoir de manière proactive des systèmes qui facilitent l’accès à ces opportunités de manière à placer les groupes traditionnellement marginalisés au centre tout en veillant à ce que des protections soient en place pour atténuer la création de groupes nouvellement marginalisés. Les nouveaux contrats sociaux doivent établir des mécanismes qui atténuent la polarisation toxique au sein des sociétés et la méfiance entre les gouvernements et leurs citoyens en fournissant les structures et les institutions nécessaires pour développer et maintenir une citoyenneté partagée.

Les nouveaux contrats sociaux doivent répondre à des contextes particuliers (voir encadré 1). En Asie et dans le Pacifique, les partis ethno-nationalistes sont en train de changer le visage de ce qui était autrefois considéré comme l’une des sociétés les plus diversifiées au monde. L’inégalité, telle qu’elle se manifeste à travers la pauvreté, l’accès aux services, la violence, la corruption et le changement climatique, traverse ces contextes et motive les demandes de changement des populations.

La guerre d’agression russe en Ukraine a ébranlé l’Europe, obligeant la région à repenser les considérations de sécurité et à faire face aux crises alimentaire et énergétique imminentes. Elle a également soulevé d’importantes questions sur la nature même de la démocratie européenne et occidentale, qui a fait preuve de deux poids deux mesures troublantes en ce qui concerne la migration et le sort des réfugiés. Ces questions sont d’autant plus importantes dans le contexte de montée en puissance de partis épousant des convictions nativistes et xénophobes.

En Afrique, des décennies d’accaparement de l’État par des dirigeants « hommes forts » illibéraux ( 5 ) ont entraîné un grave déclin démocratique. Certains dirigeants recourent à des efforts désespérés pour modifier les constitutions et les cadres juridiques afin de les aider à se maintenir au pouvoir. Un nombre croissant de jeunes sont avides de changement et veulent des dirigeants plus sensibles à leurs préoccupations particulières. La guerre en cours en Éthiopie, où il y a eu des allégations d’ethnocide, a ensanglanté la promesse d’une réforme démocratique, qui avait été un espoir aussi récemment qu’en 2019. En Asie occidentale, le régime autoritaire reste la norme, bien que les troubles sociaux dans des endroits comme l’Iran, L’Irak et le Liban peuvent être la preuve d’une demande publique pour des sociétés nouvelles et plus ouvertes ainsi qu’un leadership plus responsable.

Un ensemble diversifié de nouveaux défis, y compris la polarisation toxique et les attaques contre les organes de gestion électorale, sont confrontés aux Amériques ; Haïti a maintenant rejoint Cuba, le Nicaragua et le Venezuela en tant que régime autoritaire. Trois démocraties en régression sur sept se trouvent dans cette région, ce qui indique un affaiblissement des institutions même dans les démocraties de longue date.

Ce rapport donne un aperçu des tendances mondiales et régionales liées à la démocratie et aux droits de l’homme, ainsi que des exemples d’efforts visant à redynamiser les contrats sociaux dans le monde. Il se termine par un ensemble de recommandations politiques conçues pour aider les décideurs politiques cherchant à catalyser la réforme démocratique.

Démocratie en recul, contrats sociaux sous pression

Le contexte mondial évolue rapidement, les pandémies, les guerres et le changement climatique créant de nouveaux défis pour la démocratie

Chapitre 1 – Tendances mondiales

La démocratie mondiale, déjà de plus en plus menacée ces dernières années, approche de la fin de 2022 avec de multiples points de basculement à l’horizon : une crise du coût de la vie, une récession mondiale imminente et des guerres récentes dans des endroits aussi divers que l’Ukraine et l’Éthiopie. Les démocraties ont du mal à équilibrer efficacement des environnements marqués par l’instabilité et l’anxiété, et les populistes continuent de gagner du terrain dans le monde alors que l’innovation et la croissance démocratiques stagnent ou déclinent.

Il existe des schémas troublants même dans les pays qui s’en sortent relativement bien, se situent à des niveaux moyens à élevés de normes démocratiques et ne reculent pas (Figure 3).

Au cours des cinq dernières années, les progrès ont stagné pour les quatre attributs agrégés des indices de l’état mondial de la démocratie (indices GSoD). Dans certains cas, les scores sont les mêmes qu’en 1990.

La stagnation existe parallèlement au déclin démocratique ailleurs. Le nombre de pays en recul (sept) reste à son apogée, et le nombre de pays évoluant vers l’autoritarisme est plus du double du nombre évoluant vers la démocratie. À la fin de 2021, près d’un tiers des 173 pays évalués par International IDEA connaissent une baisse d’au moins un sous-attribut de la démocratie.

Encadré 2 – Méthodologie de mesure de l’état mondial de la démocratie

Les indices de l’état mondial de la démocratie (indices GSoD) mesurent les aspects de la démocratie et des droits de l’homme qui sont au cœur du travail d’International IDEA depuis plus de deux décennies. Alors que certaines collectes de données primaires sont menées au sein d’International IDEA, la majorité des données d’entrée pour les indices GSoD sont dérivées de 12 autres sources de données accessibles au public, avec un total de 116 variables d’entrée.

Les indices sont organisés hiérarchiquement. Au niveau le plus bas se trouvent des phénomènes spécifiques (tels que la liberté d’expression ou l’intégrité et la sécurité personnelles) que nous appelons des sous-composants. Ceux-ci sont combinés en mesures de sous-attributs plus larges (tels que les libertés civiles ou les élections propres). Enfin, les indices de sous-attributs sont agrégés dans nos mesures les plus larges, les attributs de la démocratie. Chaque index est mis à l’échelle pour aller de 0 à 1 ; les limites sont fixées par les meilleures et les pires valeurs observées pour toutes les années du pays. Les indices GSoD n’incluent pas de valeur unique pour la qualité démocratique, ni aucun classement des pays. Leur utilité principale réside dans les indices spécifiques, qui peuvent être utilisés pour suivre les progrès dans le temps au sein des pays et pour les comparer.

Pour regrouper les pays à des fins d’analyse, les indices GSoD classent également les pays en trois types de régimes politiques : démocratie, régime hybride ou régime autoritaire. Les démocraties sont définies comme des régimes qui organisent des élections qui répondent à des normes minimales de sens, de compétitivité et de suffrage. Les régimes hybrides se situent à un niveau moyen ou supérieur dans le gouvernement représentatif, mais ne répondent pas à cette norme électorale.

Dans la catégorie des démocraties, les indices GSoD incluent également des différenciations dans la performance globale pour aider à regrouper les pays à des fins d’analyse. Ces classifications sont basées sur les niveaux de performance au sein des cinq attributs de la démocratie. Pour chaque attribut, nous classons les pays comme ayant des performances élevées (au moins 0,7), moyennes (0,4 à 0,69) ou faibles (0,39 et moins) en fonction de leurs valeurs d’attribut. Les pays qui sont très performants sur tous les attributs sont appelés « démocraties très performantes » ; celles qui n’atteignent pas cette barre haute sont appelées « démocraties aux performances moyennes », et celles qui obtiennent de faibles performances sur au moins un attribut sont appelées « démocraties aux performances médiocres ».

Les indices GSoD tiennent également compte des changements importants dans le temps. Les pays qui connaissent les baisses les plus sévères de la qualité démocratique sont classés comme connaissant un recul démocratique. Nous évaluons le recul avec une référence particulière aux baisses des contrôles sur le gouvernement, des libertés civiles et des élections propres. Les pays qui ont diminué de plus de 0,1 sur la moyenne de ces trois indicateurs critiques sont codés comme connaissant un recul démocratique.

Figure 1 – Le cadre de l’état mondial de la démocratie

Figure 2 – Classification des régimesClassement des régimes

Infographie 3

Figure 3 – Expansion et contraction des démocraties au fil du tempsExpansion et contraction des démocraties au fil du temps

Notes : Ce graphique illustre à la fois le nombre total de démocraties et leur statut. Pour 2021, cela montre qu’il y a un total de 104 démocraties. Parmi celles-ci, 14 sont des « démocraties en expansion », ce qui signifie qu’elles ont connu des changements positifs et significatifs dans un nombre net d’au moins deux sous-attributs (sur 16). Quarante-deux autres démocraties sont « stables », ce qui signifie que le décompte net des sous-attributs positifs par rapport aux sous-attributs négatifs est égal à zéro ou à un. Cependant, 37 démocraties sont classées comme «modérément contractantes», ce qui signifie qu’elles ont un nombre net négatif d’un ou deux sous-attributs. Les démocraties les plus préoccupantes sont les 11 qui sont classées comme «sévèrement contractantes», qui ont un négatif net de trois sous-attributs ou plus.

Source : International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, < https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices >, consulté le 24 octobre 2022.

Compte tenu de ces tendances, la frustration croissante du public est compréhensible. Le nombre de manifestations dans le monde a plus que doublé entre 2017 et 2022, déclenchées par un large éventail de problèmes. ( 6) L’un des exemples les plus frappants a été celui du Sri Lanka, où des manifestants sont descendus dans la rue à la mi-2022 pour exiger des comptes pour le défaut de paiement de la dette du gouvernement et ont finalement forcé le président à fuir et à démissionner (voir encadré 7). Bien que la capacité et la volonté des gens de protester publiquement soient un signe de fonctionnement démocratique, c’est aussi un avertissement. L’incapacité des gouvernements à réagir efficacement pourrait porter atteinte à la légitimité du modèle démocratique. L’enquête mondiale sur les valeurs (qui couvre 77 pays) montre que moins de la moitié (47,4 %) de tous les répondants pensent que la démocratie est importante, contre 52,4 % en 2017. Il s’agit d’une baisse inquiétante, d’autant plus que moins de la moitié pensent que le fait d’avoir une démocratie, c’est « très bien ». ( 7 )

Dans le même temps, la confiance dans le gouvernement démocratique est en baisse. Les données d’enquête indiquent que la proportion de personnes qui sont d’accord avec l’idée qu’avoir un leader fort qui n’a pas à se soucier du parlement ou des élections n’a cessé d’augmenter ces dernières années. En 2009, le World Values ​​Survey a rapporté que seulement 38 % des personnes interrogées pensaient que cette idée était assez bonne ou très bonne. En 2021, ce chiffre était passé à 52 % (figure 4).

Les baisses générales et la stagnation ne sont cependant pas le seul problème. La guerre de la Russie en Ukraine a catapulté l’idée de démocratie sur le devant de la scène internationale. La guerre démontre à quel point la croissance démocratique peut être menaçante pour les régimes autoritaires, et elle a refait surface le clivage de l’époque de la guerre froide entre une communauté démocratique relativement unie et des régimes autoritaires. ( 8 ) La menace que la démocratisation fait peser sur les autoritaires souligne également à quel point il est essentiel de veiller à ce que les démocraties disposent du soutien interne et externe dont elles ont besoin pour surmonter les crises. C’est l’une des raisons pour lesquelles il est alarmant de voir de nombreux pays donateurs réduire leur aide au développement, qui comprend souvent une aide à la démocratie. ( 9 )

La relative réticence des démocraties non occidentales à condamner fermement le président russe Vladimir Poutine révèle de profondes divisions. Certains régimes considèrent le tollé occidental en faveur de la démocratie comme quelque peu hypocrite, en particulier à la lumière des multiples cas passés d’agression occidentale. ( 10 ) Les appels occidentaux au soutien des idéaux démocratiques contrastent également fortement avec les réponses racistes aux flux de réfugiés et la nette différence d’attention portée au sort de l’Ukraine par rapport à d’autres guerres meurtrières de longue date. ( 11 )

Figure 4 – Opinion publique sur le leadership autocratiqueL'opinion publique sur le leadership autocratique

Notes : La figure représente les réponses à la question de l’Enquête sur les valeurs mondiales : « Diriez-vous qu' »avoir un dirigeant fort qui n’a pas à s’occuper du parlement et des élections » est une très bonne, assez bonne, assez mauvaise ou très mauvaise façon de gouverner ce pays?’

Source : R. Inglehart, C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez- Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin et B. Puranen (eds), World Values ​​Survey : All Rounds—Country-Pooled Datafile Version 3.0, Madrid, Espagne 
et Vienne, Autriche : JD Systems Institute et WVSA Secretariat, 2022, < https:/www.doi.org/10.14281/18241.17 > .

1.1. MODÈLES MONDIAUX

The latest GSoD Indices data show that democracy is in decline, compounding a decade marked by more deterioration than democratization. First, between 2016 and 2021, the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism was more than double the number moving towards democracy (Figure 5). During that time, 27 countries experienced a downgrade in their regime classification, while only 13 improved. The world also lost two more democracies in 2021—Myanmar and Tunisia. Moreover, 52 democracies are now eroding, experiencing a statistically significant decline on at least one subattribute—compared to only 12 a decade ago.

Figure 5 – Net movements towards and away from democracyMouvements nets vers et loin de la démocratie

Notes: This bar graph shows the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism (from democracy to either a hybrid or authoritarian regime, or from a hybrid to an authoritarian regime) in red or towards democracy (from either a hybrid or authoritarian regime to a democracy or from an authoritarian to a hybrid regime) in green, by year since 1975. Years shown in dark green rather than pale green are those where the number of countries moving in a democratic direction outnumbers those moving in an authoritarian direction. Years shown in dark red rather than pale red are those where the changes towards authoritarianism outnumber the changes towards democracy.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Second, backsliding, which refers to a more severe and deliberate kind of democratic erosion, continues to mar democracies’ trajectories; the latest data show seven backsliding countries. Brazil, El Salvador, Hungary and Poland are severely backsliding, and India, Mauritius, and the United States are moderately backsliding (Figure 6). This pattern, which reveals how common it has become for elected leaders to use their power to weaken democratic institutions from inside the system, indicates the fragility of democracy and the need to shore up institutions so they can withstand such pressures, especially in times of crisis.

Figure 6 – Trends over the past five years in backsliding countriesTendances au cours des cinq dernières années dans les pays en recul

Notes: Points at 2021 values and traces back to 2016.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Figure 7 – Declining performance among authoritarian regimesBaisse des performances des régimes autoritaires

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Third, authoritarianism continues to deepen. Almost half (49.3 per cent) of all authoritarian regimes are declining in at least one subattribute. Afghanistan, Belarus, Cambodia, Comoros and Nicaragua have experienced a broad decline across multiple GSoD Indices subattributes (Figure 7). The Clean Elections and Effective Parliament subattributes are the most commonly impacted across these cases, suggesting that even maintaining the façade of elections is a struggle.

Fourth, democracy does not appear to be evolving in a way that reflects quickly changing needs and priorities. There is little improvement even in democracies that are performing at mid-range or high levels. The global scores for Representative Government, Fundamental Rights and Checks on Government are exactly the same as they were in 2001, continuing at the same mid-level range of performance (Figure 8). Impartial Administration and Civil Society Participation have also remained essentially static.

Figure 8 – World averages for attributes of democracyMoyennes mondiales des attributs de la démocratie

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

The Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine have highlighted the stark inequality between and within countries, and the public are frustrated. Even countries that are doing well, and even in the wake of crises, democracies are not necessarily growing or developing better or more broadly, or creating more innovative institutions and mechanisms.

Chapter 2 – Regional trends

2.1. AFRICA AND WEST ASIA

Key findings

  • Despite myriad challenges, Africa remains resilient in the face of instability. Countries including The Gambia, Niger and Zambia continue to improve in democratic quality. Overcoming a restricted civic space, civic action in several countries has created opportunities to renegotiate the social contract; outcomes have varied by country.
  • In West Asia, more than a decade after the Arab Uprisings, protest movements continue to be motivated by government failures in service delivery and economic opportunities—key aspects of social contracts. In response, disillusioned and excluded youth have mobilized, and their demands for a seat at the table highlight their political consciousness and vital role as drivers of political change and better governance.
  • Some resource-rich authoritarian regimes that have survived by distributing the economic benefits of hydrocarbon sales have come under scrutiny. There is evidence that people want more accountability and a reform of what have been limited obligations to provide public goods and social welfare.
  • Coups d’état and unconstitutional transfers of power have transformed Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali into new frontiers of instability, but they are only the most striking examples in a general picture of declining regime performance across a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

2.1.1 Introduction

Africa and West Asia (also known as the Middle East) is a key area of contestation between democratic and autocratic approaches to politics. Legacies of colonization remain politically and economically relevant, as many national economies are built on the extraction and export of raw materials—a dynamic that has hampered political and economic progress.(12) Yet, the systems of governance that developed after independence are being increasingly contested.

Systems of governance (and the social contracts they enforce) vary widely across this diverse group of countries. However, they can be broadly grouped into two types, one dominant in sub-Saharan Africa and the other dominant in North Africa and West Asia. In the former, extractive institutions were developed in the colonial period that concentrated political power and material gains first in foreign hands, and then among a new local elite. (13) This political class then used the distribution of some of these gains to cultivate support for the legitimacy of the system. Such institutions have tended to persist. This centralized relationship between the provision of resources and the legitimacy of the system of governance is often termed neopatrimonial. (14) A patrimonial social contract is not necessarily counter to democracy, since reciprocity can be legitimate. (15) However, institutions in many states have developed in a way that has limited accountability and maintained high levels of inequality.

In recent years, several countries have experienced opportunities to renegotiate these social contracts with varied success. Large mobilizations questioning the legitimacy and authority of governments have occurred in 2021 and 2022 in Eswatini, (16) Ghana, (17) Libya (18) and Sudan, (19) among other countries. The combination of young populations, economic challenges and ethnically- driven politics raises the stakes for changes in social contracts.

Several countries in Africa have experienced major changes in their democratic performance over the past year—for good and for ill. The continent is key to the future of the planet, as it is home to countries with the fastest rates of population growth, (20) and many of those most exposed to the effects of climate change. (21) It is also increasingly important geostrategically, as various African countries supply rare-earth minerals, oil and natural gas, and agricultural land that are coveted by powerful states in other regions. The increasing relevance of these resources, as well as the resurgence of coal exports in response to the global energy crisis, (22) may pose new challenges for democratic consolidation, as external involvement in domestic politics may increase alongside foreign economic interests.

Somewhat differently, social contracts across much of North Africa and West Asia depend on a rentier economy, in which the state is primarily funded through the sale of raw materials (chiefly hydrocarbons). (23) While rent seeking may also characterize neopatrimonialism, the extent to which rents from resource extraction fund the state is a distinguishing feature between the two models. (24) Rentier systems impede democratic development because they undermine the reciprocal relationships of rights and duties that enable accountable governance. As long as the government is able to provide sufficient economic benefits to the people, rentier states can be relatively stable—even if they are almost always authoritarian.

In West Asia, authoritarian leaders are still dominant a decade after the Arab Uprisings, partly because of the rentier model. Oil revenues have provided a substitute for democracy in the oil-exporting countries in West Asia, where rent distribution has secured the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. Some countries in the region— such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—have never experienced democracy and rely on their oil and gas assets and geopolitical location to sustain their power.

2.1.2. Trends in West Asia and North Africa

West Asia and North Africa continues to be the most authoritarian region in the world, with only three democracies—Iraq, Israel, (25) and Lebanon. Five countries are hybrid regimes (Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), and 12 countries (60 per cent) are authoritarian. Several countries in the region have experienced declines in political institutions and rights protections since 2020, including Iran, Palestine, Sudan and Tunisia. As of 2021 only 11 per cent of the population of North Africa and West Asia were living in a democracy, and 14 per cent were living in a hybrid regime; the vast majority of people in the region (75 per cent) were living in an authoritarian regime (Figure 9).

Figure 9 – Population under regime types in North Africa and West AsiaPopulation sous types de régimes en Afrique du Nord et en Asie occidentale

Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Two of the democracies, Lebanon and Iraq, remain fragile and suffer persistently low (and declining) performance. Amid these challenges to democratic consolidation, attempts to reform the political system through electoral means provide grounds for cautious optimism. The parliamentary elections that took place on 10 October 2021 (Iraq) and 15 May 2022 (Lebanon) were influenced (and in the case of Iraq directly triggered) by movements that were driven by dissatisfaction with the quality of social justice, control of corruption and public services. Although established parties in both countries maintained their dominance, the elections gave life to new movements that have the potential to grow in future elections. (26) In Lebanon, independent candidates opposed to the political establishment also made breakthroughs. (27)

In Iran, the legitimacy of the social contract seems to be fading. (28) The 2022 protests were sparked by the immediate issue of women’s rights, but they have broadened in scope and highlight how demands for change are manifested even in repressive contexts. The case of the World Cup in Qatar highlights the international linkages that arise in some repressive contexts, as foreign workers who protested to demand their wages were deported, (29) and the foreign football teams who will participate in the tournament have struggled to find an effective approach to support the workers. (30)

Figure 10 – Representative Government scores across West Asia and North Africa in 2021Representative Government scores across West Asia and North Africa in 2021

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

For a decade, Tunisia was the major success story from the Arab Uprisings. The protests that led to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime’s 23-year reign in 2011 were driven by a widespread rejection of the social contract. The 2014 Constitution created a new social contract through an inclusive and participatory process, enshrining several socio-economic rights, including the right to decent working conditions and a fair wage. Yet the economy continued to decline. In the midst of a Covid-induced economic crisis and a loss of confidence in political parties, (31) President Saied suspended (and then dissolved) the parliament and a significant portion of the Constitution in 2021 and 2022. (32) This effectively suspended democracy in Tunisia; the GSoD Indices reclassified it as a hybrid regime. A new constitution, drafted in 2022 under Saied’s control and in violation of the rules for constitutional amendment, significantly weakened the legislature and judiciary, concentrating power in the presidency. (33) Tunisia’s December 2022 parliamentary election will be a key test of the degree to which the new constitutional order can support democracy.

Box 3 – Renegotiating the social contract in Iraq

Democracy in Iraq has endured turbulent years. Anti- government protests and political turmoil illustrate the growing disconnect between citizens and public institutions. A deteriorating economy caused by a fall in oil prices and the effects of Covid-19 has increased public disillusionment. (34) Iraqis have grown increasingly tired of the state’s inability to deliver services and development. As a result, Iraqis took to the streets in October 2019. The cross-sectarian and national uprisings, known as the Tishreen protest movement, emphasized widespread discontent with ruling elites and deep distrust in the state and its institutions. (35)

The protests, driven by youth, called for the government to step down and an end to the current consociational power- sharing system, which they claim reduces representatives’ accountability. (36) Trust in the country’s political system is among the lowest in the region, and corruption perceptions are among the highest. (37) Iraq’s consociational system has enabled the expansion of corruption and patronage networks of the ruling ethno-sectarian parties. (38) A clientelist system evolved based on sharing the country’s oil wealth, serving elite interests at the expense of the citizens. With one of the youngest populations in the world, where nearly 60 per cent are under the age of 25, Iraq’s post-2003 patronage networks have excluded an increasing proportion of the population.

The effects of the Tishreen movement still reverberate two years later as the grievances remain, and young people continue to be excluded from the decision-making process. Reimagining a new social contract will be a long-term process involving comprehensive political and economic reform that includes genuine opportunities for the youth to be heard and help improve the country’s situation. Short-term responses can provide alternative venues to address some of the protestors’ demands within the current government structures. Two Baghdad-based think tanks provide cases that suggest possible pathways for inclusive and resilient social contracts.

The Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies supports youth activism and mechanisms to channel social protest through several initiatives to increase political awareness, engage with civil society and create avenues for representation to ensure their voices are heard by the political elite. A dedicated series of skill development and entrepreneurial training programmes provide better economic opportunities. Al Bayan’s work promotes the political, social and economic inclusion of youth in Iraq in an effort to restore hope and a sense of belonging. (39)

The Rewaq Baghdad Center is working towards creating cultural and behavioural shifts in the political class, as well as improving citizen–state relations in Iraq. (40) It works closely with parliament to offer a wide range of knowledge products and policy assistance to improve legislation. It launched a mobile application ahead of the October 2021 elections, designed to reinforce citizens’ participation in the decision- making process and innovating democracy mechanisms. (41) The first of its kind in the country, the online tool allowed voters to engage in dialogue with candidates. Given young people’s proclivity to use information and communications technology tools and platforms, the application provided an incentive for Iraqi youth to participate, benefiting more than 100,000 users.

2.1.3. Trends in sub-Saharan Africa

The situation in sub-Saharan Africa has been much more dynamic (Figure 11). Free and fair elections in Niger and Zambia have allowed both countries to be reclassified as democracies. Zambia held a credible general election in 2021 in which the defeated presidential incumbent swiftly conceded. (42) Niger’s transition has been more difficult. Its 2021 election marked the country’s first peaceful transition of power as President Mahamadou Issoufou stepped down after two five-year terms and was replaced by Mohamed Bazoum, who won the second round of the election.

However, opposition parties made allegations of fraud, (43) and a coup attempt was put down a few days before the presidential inauguration. (44)

The share of the region’s population living under democracy has declined over the last five years. As of the end of 2021, only 27 per cent were living in a democracy—equal to the share living in an authoritarian regime. After the change in Nigeria from democracy to hybrid (in 2019), the plurality of the region’s population (45 per cent) now lives in a hybrid regime.

Figure 11 – Population under regime types in sub-Saharan AfricaPopulation under regime types in sub-Saharan Africa

Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Three countries that stand out as having declined in their performance have experienced coups d’état or unconstitutional changes of government—Chad, Guinea and Mali (Figure 12).45 Benin, Central African Republic, Comoros, Mauritius and Nigeria have demonstrated broader declines in performance. Common themes in countries in the region that are experiencing democratic decline are the restriction of civic space (46) and the manipulation of elections and term limits to serve the interests of those with (ongoing or prospective) presidential ambitions. The GSoD Indices show that Civil Liberties have significantly declined in eight African countries over the last five years.

The Gambia is the continent’s main success story over the past five years; it has dramatically improved its democratic performance. Since Yahya Jammeh was defeated in the 2016 presidential election, the country has improved on almost every indicator measured by the GSoD Indices. These advances reflect the vision of the country’s National Development Plan—a new social contract for Gambians that aims to deliver good governance, national reconciliation, improved social cohesion and an inclusive economy. (47) Its implementation has involved a transitional justice process, security sector reform and a constitutional review. (48) Kenya’s 2022 election is another success story (see Box 4).

Figure 12 – Change in average score across subattributes of democracy (2016–2021), selected countries in sub-Saharan AfricaChange in average score across subattributes of democracy (2016–2021), selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa

Notes: Points denote current values; tails extend back to 2016.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Box 4 – Kenya’s 2022 election

The 2022 Kenyan election was broadly assessed as credible and largely peaceful, and ethnicity was less salient than in past years. (49) However, other unresolved issues, both old and new, present an ambiguous case for the country’s democratization trajectory. The public fracturing of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) over the validity of the official result highlights the difficulty of achieving a fully independent electoral process. (50) More broadly, the election was met with widespread voter apathy (especially among younger voters), (51) and turnout was only 64.8 per cent (Figure 13). (52) However, the election moderately increased women’s representation to 21 per cent of the legislature, though this remains far below the one-third target set by the Constitution. (53) It was also lauded for increased transparency, due to the use of a publicly accessible online results portal and the IEBC’s memorandum of understanding with media houses to announce the results from polling stations. The successes of the 2022 election should be celebrated, but much work remains to be done.

Figure 13 – Voter turnout in Kenya (1992–2022), presidential electionsVoter turnout in Kenya (1992–2022), presidential elections

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Box 5 – Social contract renewal in Uganda

Uganda has one of Africa’s youngest populations yet one of its oldest leaders. President Museveni has ruled for 36 years—his is an increasingly authoritarian and sclerotic regime that is failing to meet Ugandans’ growing democratic aspirations58 and basic socio-economic needs.59 Yet the prospect that this aspiration– reality gap will precipitate a renewal of the social contract is currently remote, and is likely to remain so until Ugandans can agree on a shared vision for the future. Such a convergence requires pro-democracy activists to be able to effectively counter the regime’s polarizing narrative, in which it presents itself as the guarantor of stability and growth and its critics as being in the service of foreign powers. (60)

It is not for a lack of alternatives that this narrative has prevailed, but rather the Museveni regime’s ability to limit Ugandans’ exposure to these accounts. Since the introduction of multiparty elections in Uganda in 2005, opposition party voices have been among the loudest calling for a new democratic dispensation. Yet by starving such parties of funding, shutting them out of rural areas, repressing their activists and restricting their access to the media, the regime has ensured that their voices reach only a fraction of their intended audience. (61) The 2021 general elections were an inflection point in this regard. The regime deployed these tactics with an unprecedented level of violence, particularly against the National Unity Platform (NUP) party; its governance reform agenda and popular leader, the musician-turned-politician Bobi Wine, had helped it galvanize Uganda’s urban youth. (62) In response to this escalation, the NUP has sought to strengthen its capacity to disseminate its message across the country through the construction of a network of mobilization committees, known as Kunga Committees. (63) The new committees’ ability to compete with the deeply embedded structures of the Museveni regime and to withstand its repression remains to be seen.

While generally less confrontational than the pro-democracy opposition parties, Uganda’s civil society has historically been a source of ideas and practices that challenge the country’s authoritarian trajectory. The regime has increasingly come to view them as a threat to its power. Using methods similar to those deployed against opposition parties, it has hollowed out civil society’s democracy sector, forcing organizations to close or to engage in less overtly political work. (64)

As demographic and economic factors push Ugandans into an ever more conflictual relationship with Museveni’s militarized regime, the need for a responsive democratic social contract has become urgent. However, those striving to bring it about have been left muzzled and despondent.

Box 6 – South Africa’s young climate policymakers

As the demographic that will be hardest hit by continued global warming, the world’s youth have the greatest stake in the unfolding climate crisis. (65) Yet despite their widespread advocacy on the issue, young people have largely been excluded from climate policymaking. (66) In South Africa this is beginning to change.

The most visible sign of this progress has been the recent presence of official youth delegates among the country’s delegations to the United Nations Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (COPs). (67) Independent of the government, they are mandated to represent the views of young South Africans at the negotiations. The delegates are selected from a growing pool of young climate activists with both a sophisticated understanding of climate change and the skillset needed to effectively participate in high-level policymaking. The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has cultivated a youth-run network of organizations and activists that convenes to draft climate policy documents which articulate its members’ perspectives and priorities. (68) Stakeholders regard these documents as authoritative representations of the youth voice and useful tools for shaping climate policy. Young activists have also been involved in formulating government climate policy: several worked on the City of Johannesburg’s 2021 Climate Action Plan.

Youth participation in such policymaking and influencing is a marked departure from the situation in South Africa a decade ago, when young voices were absent from climate policy spaces. Desirée Kosciulek, the Head of Youth Programmes at SAIIA, characterizes this progress as being youth driven but credits the South African Government with being a responsive partner. She notes its willingness to increase the number of official youth delegates to the COP from one to three and to adapt policy processes to meet the needs of young participants (e.g. scheduling meetings outside of school hours and covering transport costs).

Having secured a seat at the table, the next challenge for South Africa’s youth (and other stakeholders) is to ensure that their participation in climate policy processes is meaningful. For Kosciulek, the first step will be to define what meaningful participation is, but she is clear that it is not one-off or tokenistic engagement.

2.1.4. Conclusion

Across Africa and West Asia, social contracts are likely to come under increasing strain in the short to medium term as the broader effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drive food and energy costs up—though the effects will vary between energy-exporting and -importing countries. Many countries are also facing increasing borrowing costs as a result of higher interest rates and the strengthening of the US dollar. These challenges must be addressed in a context of longstanding problems with youth unemployment, poverty and inequality. (54) Generational change in politics could also play a role in some African countries, as the already fragile legitimacy of ageing autocrats will be further tested by demands from a young population for better economic outcomes, and more freedoms in politics and culture. (55)

Longer-term dynamics that may disrupt these rentier social contracts include continuing youth unemployment (Figure 14) and the green energy transition. The UN recently estimated that 33 million jobs will need to be created across North Africa and West Asia by 2030 to keep up with the growth in the youth population. (56) Similar dynamics apply in Africa more generally. The failure to deliver such jobs could generate pressure for change. Looking further ahead, decarbonization may threaten oil-exporting states’ ability to fund social programmes at current levels.

Several important elections are scheduled for 2023, including a general election in Nigeria and a legislative election in Benin. Both countries’ democratic performance has declined since 2019, but they have an opportunity to reverse that trend in 2023. Sierra Leone will also hold elections for the president and parliament next year, hoping to build on recent improvements in democratic performance. While the situation in Libya remains unpredictable, it is possible that a new constitution will be drafted and national elections organized in 2023.

Demand for democracy remains high in the region, but satisfaction with democratic performance is low. (57) How that gap is addressed will be determinative for many countries in the next five years.

Figure 14 – Unemployment rate among job-seeking youth (15–24) in Africa and West AsiaUnemployment rate among job-seeking youth (15–24) in Africa and West Asia

Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data as of June 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS>, accessed 15 June 2022.

2.2. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Key findings

  • Democracy is receding in Asia and the Pacific, while authoritarianism solidifies. Only 54 per cent of people in the region live in a democracy, and almost 85 per cent of those live in one that is weak or backsliding. Even high- and mid-performing democracies, such as Australia, Japan and Taiwan are suffering democratic erosion.
  • Although erosion has taken place in all aspects of democracy, the impact on Freedom of Expression and Media Integrity is striking: 35 per cent of democracies in the region exhibit erosion in at least one of them.
  • Although highly diverse, common elements eroding democracy are, inter alia, rising ethno-nationalism, military intervention in political processes, patronage politics and executive aggrandizement.
  • This negative trend is tearing the social contract apart in many countries, with a demand for increased accountability and an overhaul of the political system in countries as varied as Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The cases of Kazakhstan and Thailand also highlight the popular discontent with some fundamental characteristics of the political system that were assumed to be immovable, such as the role of the King in Thailand or the focus on economic development over freedoms in Kazakhstan.
  • The continuing effects of the pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have been particularly acute for Central and South Asian countries, providing political space for both democratic renewal and opportunistic authoritarians.

2.2.1 Introduction

Democracy in Asia and the Pacific is receding. In the last five years, approximately 60 per cent of the 35 countries in the region, including half of the democracies, have suffered significant decreases in at least one subattribute. Although the most dramatic examples of breakdown have been in Afghanistan and Myanmar, even more longstanding and stable democratic systems in India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan are at risk.

Nearly half of the region’s inhabitants live in an authoritarian regime (72 per cent of those live in China) (Figure 15). More than three-quarters (84 per cent) of residents of a democracy in Asia and the Pacific live in one that is weak or backsliding. (69)

The erosion of democracy in the region is a product of several factors, including the rise of exclusionary ethno-nationalist movements fuelled by a mix of real and politically manipulated social grievances, armed and unarmed interventions by the military in political processes, executive aggrandizement, stalled democratic transitions and economic mismanagement that has led to unsustainable debts and, in extreme cases, financial collapse. Countries’ democratic trajectories are shaped by their postcolonial histories as well as their neocolonial political and economic relationships with regional hegemons. But these factors should not be overstated: national elites have long proved adept at using the legacy of colonialism to deflect criticism from their own mismanagement and cronyism.

Additionally, foreign actors’ geopolitical interests are impacting domestic politics. In Nepal, citizens protested against the approval of a USD 500 million grant from a US aid agency due to concerns that the grant conditions unacceptably infringed upon national sovereignty. (70) In Kazakhstan and Sri Lanka, foreign actors have assisted incumbent leaders in various ways, angering citizens, who demand accountability and responsiveness. (71)

Figure 15 – Population under regime types in Asia and the PacificPopulation under regime types in Asia and the Pacific

Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.

2.2.2. Trends in the region

Social contracts are being tested, renegotiated and disputed across the region, and subregional nuances are fundamental to understanding these tensions. In South Asia, where communal mistrust and competition have in some cases been addressed through power sharing, economic crises and the rise of illiberal forces have contributed to the resurgence of ethno-nationalism. Resulting violence against minority groups and increased societal polarization highlight the pressures exerted on the social contract. (72) The persistence of pandemic-instigated disruption to migrant flows and remittances on which South Asian economies heavily depend adds to the economic anxieties that fuel ethno- nationalism and remains an unsolved problem for the region. (73)

An active civil society and the strength of some key institutions—such as the judiciary and electoral management bodies (EMBs)—can act as bastions of democracy. India’s active civil society have been key in denouncing some states’ attempts to limit religious freedoms. In Nepal, citizen and civil society mobilizations demanding accountability, gender equality and good governance remain a fundamental and influential political force. (74)

The breakdown of democracy in Myanmar is the major event in Southeast Asian democratic development. Yet actors like the National Unity Government and the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, which are building new democratic institutions that reflect many longstanding concerns regarding minority rights and equal access to public goods, demonstrate the will to build a new social contract.

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam remain firmly anchored in authoritarianism with no visible signals of change. Vietnam, like China and Singapore, has managed to provide economic prosperity without granting democratic rights, giving its communist regime a veneer of public legitimacy. An economic crisis and possible debt default in Laos have generated signs of popular dissatisfaction with the government but have not manifested in the kind of organized protest in favour of a responsive and accountable social contract seen recently in Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka and elsewhere. As Laos is politically and economically dominated by its stable authoritarian neighbours, China and Vietnam, its people may feel that democratic progress is currently infeasible or too risky. (75)

In the Philippines, an intensive disinformation campaign supported the ascent of the son of Ferdinand Marcos, known as Bongbong Marcos, to the presidency. Yet, pro-democracy movements in Thailand and Malaysia and the refusal to accept the military junta in Myanmar demonstrate that democracy remains a core aspiration for millions in Southeast Asia, even in the most repressive circumstances. In Thailand, protesters have demanded concrete policy changes, such as the elimination of the military’s power to hand-pick senators and select the prime minister, and the reversal of the prohibition of some political parties. They have also challenged the country’s political and economic elite model of governance, including by questioning the role of the monarchy for the first time in decades. However, the ghost of military dictatorships past is not always easy to exorcise; in Indonesia and the Philippines, the military’s significant public role in the pandemic response dashed hopes that the armed forces’ retreat from the political sphere during recent periods of democratization might be permanent. (76)

East Asia remains stable and, apart from China, predominantly democratic. During the last five years, democracy has expanded notably in South Korea and remained stable in Japan and Taiwan. Mongolia continues last year’s trend of declines across all attributes except Representative Government. The rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and mainland China’s suppression of democracy in Hong Kong and incursion on Bhutanese sovereignty are clear examples of its willingness to exert its influence in the region. (77)

Oceania continues to stand out for its strong democratic performance, although declines in certain attributes, largely due to expanded pandemic-related restrictions, curb the region’s overall performance. It is particularly vulnerable to climate change (78) and has been the site of intense geopolitical competition between China, Australia and the USA. Overall, the region has witnessed a slight drop in its Impartial Administration score; New Zealand and Papua New Guinea have experienced one- year declines in Predictable Enforcement, in the latter case accompanied by a significant and concerning drop in the Absence of Corruption.

Central Asia’s democratic indicators continue to be marked by stagnation as national elites have proven adept at putting down, often violently, popular movements advocating more democratic and broadly accountable political institutions. The relaxation of Karimov-era social controls in Uzbekistan appears to have stalled, and protests over the loss of regional autonomy in the impoverished western Karakalpakstan region were put down with extreme violence. (79) Kyrgyzstan continues its slow and steady decline across many indicators; the 2020 electoral protests and installation of Sadyr Japarov as prime minister, and later president, are symptoms. Kazakhstan’s ‘Black January’ and Tajikistan’s bloody 2022 crackdown in the Gorno- Badakhshan Autonomous Region demonstrate how long-term stagnation in authoritarian regimes can be a source of, rather than a guard against, instability and violence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has caused tens of thousands of Russian refugees to flee to Central Asia— primarily to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. (80) The economic impacts of the war, sanctions and refugee flows are complex and not necessarily negative, but managing them will be demanding for the region’s democratic and authoritarian institutions. While there is genuine public solidarity with Russian refugees arriving in the region, there is also unease and hostility stemming from Russia’s unresolved postcolonial relationship with its former Central Asian colonies. (81)

Box 7 – Social contract renewal in Sri Lanka

The spring of 2022 may prove to be a watershed moment for Sri Lankan democracy. Over the past two years, a fundamental breakdown of the social contract between the state and society has resulted in unprecedented (in both scale and the degree of unity) anti-government demonstrations. (82) What began as protests over food, fuel, power cuts and essential supply shortages quickly morphed into demands for system-wide reform, culminating in thousands of protesters storming the president’s and prime minister’s residences and offices on 9 July 2022 and leading to their resignations. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe became acting president shortly thereafter.

The months-long peaceful protests are a testament to the resilience of Sri Lankan democracy, though significant challenges lie ahead. Sri Lankans are eager to see greater transparency and accountability of elected representatives, but there are concerns that ‘one has to work within the present system’. (83 )A key challenge is the power of status quo elites, who undermine key reforms. For example, the Colombo-based Centre for Policy Alternatives has called for the government’s proposed 22nd Amendment to abolish the executive presidency to be rejected, deeming it to be a ‘token reform’ that does not sufficiently curtail the powers of the president or introduce meaningful checks and balances. (84) The Colombo Urban Lab similarly cautions that Sri Lankans should not be misled by the interim government’s small gestures and proposals, which demonstrate its weak commitment to fundamental reforms. (85) This includes abolishing the executive presidency, repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act, increasing social protection and planning for fresh elections. Superficial reforms will no longer satisfy Sri Lankans’ grievances.

Ultimately, a new social contract can only be forged through deliberation that bridges the trust deficit between the public and policymakers. This, too, requires a reckoning with Civil War-era violations to build a more inclusive national identity. Small changes, including more power sharing in parliament and a greater representation of protesters’ demands with the rise of the Frontline Social Party, could bode well for the democracy, if they materialize. (86) Indeed, opposition parties such as the National People’s Power and Samagi Jana Balawegaya are perceived as more active in raising issues of accountability and transparency, albeit with limited powers. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if (and how) political parties will transform protesters’ demands into sustainable democratic reforms.

2.2.3. The concerning increase in repression of Freedom of Expression and Media Integrity

Despite the region’s vast diversity, most countries are experiencing restrictions on the Freedom of Expression and Media Integrity. Overall, 35 per cent of democracies in Asia and the Pacific and 33 per cent of non-democracies have experienced erosion in either Freedom of Expression or Media Integrity over the last five years—a trend that predates the pandemic. Since 2018, at least 15 countries in the region have approved measures that restrict Freedom of Expression, especially online (Figure 16). (87) These measures, such as Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act, (88) Vietnam’s Cybersecurity Law, (89) Kyrgyzstan’s False Information Bill (90) and Singapore’s Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, (91) all target online content under the guise of fighting disinformation and protecting infrastructure against cyberattacks.

Figure 16 – Countries with new laws restricting freedom of expression onlineCountries with new laws restricting freedom of expression online

Source: Research by the Democracy Assessment Unit, International IDEA.

In most cases, governments employ these laws to selectively remove or block content and use social media giants as their executing arm online under the guise of fulfilling national legislation. (92) Such laws form part of a global trend in which the need to regulate online content is being used to restrict rights and fight an open Internet. Many countries are left with the worst of both worlds—a social media ecosystem in which key critical speech is censored and suppressed while disinformation that facilitates elite preservation is allowed to run rampant.

These contaminated information environments hamstring constructive political dialogue and erode key democratic institutions. They also have clear-cut effects on democratic outcomes; Bongbong Marcos and Sara Duterte won the Philippines 2022 election with the support of a well-funded social media disinformation campaign run by supporters, which whitewashed Bongbong’s father’s record as a dictator and vilified their critics. The information space had already been reshaped by Duterte’s father, Rodrigo, who spent his time as president attacking the Filipino free press through judicial harassment and executive overreach. (93)

2.2.4. Conclusion

Given the region’s varied history, including its colonial past, boisterous renegotiations of the social contract have often occurred within living memory. However, with the exception of the regional giants of China and India, the countries’ post- and neocolonial relationships continue to dictate the scope of any new social contract that might arise. Countries across the region depend on economic systems and political alliances in which they are subordinate players.

The cases of Kazakhstan and Thailand, among others, reveal that governments are not upholding their end of the social contract. Beyond a simple shift in governance, democratic erosion is also tearing at the fundamental building blocks of the social contract in many countries. With the economic consequences of the pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine stoking inflation and increasing the cost of living, and leading to unevenly distributed global shortages of basic goods and commodities, the perfect storm for unrest might be brewing in many countries in the region.

Box 8 – Kazakhstan unrest

In January 2022, protesters in Kazakhstan (Figure 17), motivated by soaring liquefied petroleum gas prices, took to the streets to demand that the government address socio-economic inequality. Under an Internet and telecommunications blackout that made definitive accounts of the roots of escalation and the identities of the main instigators nearly impossible, protests gave way to violent clashes, burning government buildings and armed conflict in the streets. President Tokayev ordered the security services to ‘shoot to kill without warning’ and called in troops from the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization to put down the protests.

According to official estimates, over 200 private citizens and 19 members of the security services were killed, hundreds tortured, and over 9,000 arrested. (94) What began as a bottom-up demand for a renegotiation of the social contract of ‘economics first, politics later’ ended in mass state-administered violence, a reshuffling of elites, and a constitutional referendum of vague purpose and efficacy. (95) Rather than create a new social contract that guarantees rights and shared wealth equitably, the country’s leadership instead seems set to refashion the old social contract around the promise of installing President Tokayev as the new national patriarch. (96)

The protests in Kazakhstan were the country’s third such public uprising since 2010, and the second to be put down violently. (97) The mix of token reforms and indiscriminate repression may have temporarily quieted Kazakhstan’s political chaos, but absent tangible changes in the socio- economic or political status quo, these tactics only delay the next inevitable confrontation between the state and its citizens. (98)

Figure 17 – Democratic quality in KazakhstanDemocratic quality in Kazakhstan

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

2.3. EUROPE

Key findings

  • Although democracy remains the main form of government in Europe, its performance is stagnant.
  • Nearly half (43 per cent) of democracies—a total of 17 countries—in Europe have suffered erosion in the last five years. These declines affect 46 per cent of the high-performing democracies.
  • Yet democratic values and institutions are increasingly seen as a fundamental barrier to Russia’s irredentism and neocolonialism, especially in Ukraine, but also in most countries in the region.
  • Democratic stagnation, the pandemic and the cost of living crisis have reignited a much-needed debate in the region on the underpinnings of the social contract and its future.

2.3.1 Introduction

Russia’s war against Ukraine has shaken Europe and sparked an unprecedented crisis that threatens the peace and stability that had long been taken for granted. High inflation, economic distress and stagnation, the rise of far-right parties, and energy supply concerns imperil the continent’s democracy even further.
These phenomena come at a time when democracy is stagnating, and often contracting, in most of the region. Although democracy remains the main form of government (see Figure 18), 43 per cent of democracies in Europe have suffered democratic erosion in the last five years. The percentage is even higher for those that are considered high performing.

Figure 18 – Population under regime types in EuropePopulation under regime types in Europe

Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has highlighted that democracy is central to the defence of peace and prosperity. By reinforcing democratic institutions and values, many countries are buttressing their defences against Russia. The expansion of democracy in Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine, for example, is a clear manifestation of the desire to root national identity and sovereignty in democratic institutions (see Figure 19). At the same time, they have intensified the fight against all types of Russian interference, from disinformation campaigns to direct military intervention. According to the Eurobarometer, the protection of democracy and its values has become more important to Europeans since the Russian invasion of Ukraine; it is now cited as the top value to be defended by the European institutions. (99)

The relative bright spots are overshadowed by the general democratic erosion in Europe. Two European countries—Poland and Hungary—are backsliding.
Six countries recorded statistically significant declines in Media Integrity. The declines affect Western Europe (Austria, Germany), Central Europe (Slovenia), the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Southern Europe (Cyprus) and Eastern Europe (Azerbaijan). This decrease in Media Integrity comes at a time when reliable, impartial information is more valuable than ever, especially in the midst of armed conflict and a looming economic crisis. (100)

Europe’s non-democratic regimes have been further consolidated in the last year. Russia has joined Belarus and Azerbaijan as the third autocratic regime in Europe. Authoritarianism in Belarus has deepened, with significant declines in nine subattributes in the last five years; Access to Justice and Freedom of Association and Assembly are the biggest decliners. The crackdown on protests and opposition has only exacerbated the situation. (101) Serbia and Turkey remain entrenched in hybridity with declines over the last five years, especially related to Clean Elections.

Figure 19 – Expanding democracies in EuropeExpanding democracies in Europe

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

2.3.2 Moldova as a bright example of democracy in Europe

With the electoral victory of liberal democratic players in Moldova, first in the presidency and then as a majority in parliament, the country has entered an unprecedented phase of democratic expansion (Figure 20). Performance improvements since 2017 mean that Moldova is now among the top 25 per cent of countries globally in terms of Representative Government (including Inclusive Suffrage and Free Political Parties), Social Rights and Equality, and Gender Equality, as well as Media Integrity.

However, corruption has persistently undermined Moldova’s post-Soviet transition to democracy. Although the fight against corruption has improved in recent years, as reflected in the Absence of Corruption subattribute, it remains a key challenge. Other indicators, such as Basic Welfare, continued to stagnate, performing below Eastern European averages.

Figure 20 – Trends in the Republic of MoldovaTrends in the Republic of Moldova

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Moldova faces both old and new challenges, from ethnic tensions that led to a separatist movement in Transnistria and continuing disputes with the ethnic Turkic Gagauz minority to—more recently—threats from Russia’s war of aggression in neighbouring Ukraine.
In this context, Moldova’s democratic expansion is noteworthy and deserves close attention as it seeks to deliver on the pro-reform and anti-corruption mandate secured in the 2020/2021 elections, and to pursue integration into the European Union.

2.3.3 The social contract in Europe

The promise of democracy as a bedrock of shared prosperity has faded in recent years, causing people to question whether this social contract is fair, or even desirable. The region, including the wealthiest countries in Western Europe, is facing a deepening cost of living crisis. (102) Unemployment, worsening labour conditions, decreasing standards of living, underinvestment in key public services, such as education and healthcare, and the rising cost of living are creating more unequal economies that generate uncertainty for many. (103) European societies are also undergoing notable changes as a result of migration and ageing populations. (104) These changes are now at the top of the list of concerns and priorities for Europeans, showcasing the tensions in the social contract. (105)

There is increasing support for nativist and illiberal populist parties all over Europe. (106) In general, these parties promise a renegotiation of the social contract, albeit in discriminatory, regressive and often unrealistic terms. Their agendas promote nationalistic, nativist, anti-immigration or illiberal policies, which threaten the rights of marginalized groups as well as those of racial, ethnic and political minorities. Another manifestation of tensions is an increasing detachment from the democratic process, seen both in the dissatisfaction with democracy and in voter turnout (see Figure 21). (107) The link between economic pessimism and dissatisfaction with democracy signals the need to forge a new social contract. But the full impacts of this poly-crisis may be yet to come. Far-right forces question some key democratic principles and might carve out political space among voters who feel politically under- represented.

Figure 21 – Trends in voter turnout in parliamentary elections in EuropeTrends in voter turnout in parliamentary elections in Europe

Notes: Red lines indicate decreases relative to 2001; green lines indicate improvement.

Source: International IDEA, Voter Turnout Database, [n.d.], <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout>, accessed 24 October 2022.

A broader conversation involving all sectors of society about how to renovate the social contract is crucial and urgent. With a negative view of politics and institutions, especially political parties, and with three out of four Europeans not trusting parties, few spaces remain available for a dialogue on a renewed social contract in Europe. (108)

The social contract in European countries is tearing at both the economic and political levels. Economic crises, such as the current situation or the 2008–2012 financial crisis, detach the population from the political process. (109) This disenfranchisement creates further space for illiberal trends by reducing popular support for democratic voices. To prevent this from happening, attempts have been made to expand political participation and international pressure for good governance. For example, Belgium has lowered the voting age for European Parliament elections to 16, reflecting a change in the terms of the social contract. (110) There was also progress in efforts to increase the implementation of recommendations by the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) in 2021. (111) Moldova and Armenia, for instance, have significantly improved their performance in Absence of Corruption. In addition, innovative forms of political participation have been tested all over Europe, including citizens’ assemblies (see Box 9), participatory budgeting in cities like Paris or Milan, sortition and new participation platforms in Estonia and Madrid. (112) Political parties have also experimented with new forms of membership, including in France, Latvia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. (113)

Box 9 – Citizens’ assemblies in Europe

In a context of declining trust between citizens and governments, there is renewed enthusiasm for participatory and deliberative mechanisms—especially citizens’ assemblies—all over Europe. Through different forms of institutionalization, these representative microcosms of the broader public have grappled with a wide range of policy issues. (114)

Citizens’ assemblies have been used in many countries and at various levels of governance. (115) Policy issues related to the environment were among the most discussed by both national and local assemblies, whereas urban and strategic planning, environment, health and infrastructure were frequently addressed at the local level. (116) At the supra-national level, during the Conference on the Future of Europe, the EU launched the European Citizens’ Panels, which deliberated and provided recommendations on issues such as migration, security, the environment, education and digital transformation. (117) Since then, tangible steps have been taken to incorporate the final report’s suggestions, which include a proposal to incorporate amendments to the current EU treaties. (118)

Sceptics have worried about ordinary citizens’ limited ability to address complex political situations and the sustainability of the model. However, evidence suggests that citizens have the capacity to make sound policy decisions, especially when the deliberative process is well designed. (119) In this context, citizens’ assemblies should be viewed as a democratic process that—like elections—requires a set of standards to ensure legitimacy and sustainability. (120) At the same time, limited representation and inclusion in citizens’ assemblies, particularly of marginalized communities, and the ad hoc way in which participatory governance is often carried out, continue to hamper this instrument. (121) Cases in which the authorities discard the majority of citizens’ assemblies’ recommendations, mainly due to special interest lobbying, further hinder their impact. (122) Whether this deliberative system works in Europe depends heavily on the commitments of governments and the EU to ensure they do not weaken citizens’ drive and ambitions to keep these assemblies alive and active.

2.3.4 Conclusion

Europe is facing the most challenging times in decades. Democratic stagnation is compounded by economic shocks and the diverse impacts of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. President Putin’s nuclear threats, as well as his strategy to weaponize Europe’s winter energy needs, call for strengthened unity in the region. The debate around the social contract is resurfacing with intensity, pushed by the unprecedented economic, political, and social shocks and the unhealed wounds of the pandemic. While democracy is being used as protection against Russian irredentism, voters in many longstanding democracies in Europe are increasingly supporting far-right and nativist parties that disregard some of the basic principles of democracy, such as press freedom or the inclusion of minorities in decision making. How European countries address the crisis will define the fate of democracy in the coming decades.

2.4. THE AMERICAS

Key findings

  • While the Americas is the world’s second-most democratic region, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela have joined Cuba as autocracies in the region.
  • A third of democracies in the region have experienced declines in at least three subattributes in the last two years. Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala and the USA exhibit the most declines.
  • In the USA, threats to democracy persist after the Trump presidency, illustrated by polarization, counter-majoritarianism and the rolling back of long- established rights.
  • Rising threats to democracy include toxic polarization, disinformation and fake news, restrictive laws and bans on rights, intimidation of the press, and increasing attacks on courts and EMBs.
  • Discontent is also on the rise. Fuelled by poverty, inequality, insecurity, corruption and the effects of the pandemic, people are turning to the ballot box and the streets, looking for change.
  • While discontent can (and has) resulted in democratic options on the ballot, populist authoritarians manipulate this dissatisfaction in an attempt to dismantle democracy from within. Democracy is an ally, not an obstacle, in revising the social contract. It offers institutional channels that can deliver for all citizens, especially the most vulnerable.

2.4.1 Introduction

The Americas is the world’s second-most democratic region (after Europe). Over the past five decades, the proportion of democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown from 32 per cent to a stunning 84 per cent (Figure 23). Democracy reached its peak in 2006–2007, when Cuba was the lone authoritarian country in the region.
This is no longer the case. Nicaragua and Venezuela have become consolidated authoritarian regimes, and in 2021 Haiti slipped into authoritarianism and has recently requested foreign assistance to quell extreme gang violence (Figure 23). Established democracies have also experienced setbacks, and declines have been especially severe in Brazil, El Salvador and the USA.

Figure 22 – Population under regime types in the AmericasPopulation under regime types in the Americas

Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Figure 23 – Trends in regime type in Latin America and the CaribbeanTrends in regime type in Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Figure 24 – Latin American countries with improved performanceLatin American countries with improved performance

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

A diverse set of issues challenges the quality and sustainability of democracy in the Americas. The last decade has witnessed growing threats, including polarization, (123) disinformation, (124) restrictions on rights, (125) and increasing attacks on environmental and human rights activists (126) as well as key democratic institutions. (127)
However, there is hope. Last year, Honduras re-joined the democratic ranks after Xiomara Castro, the region’s only female president, won a credible election, (128) with results accepted by all actors (Box 11). (129) Ecuador and the Dominican Republic have also strengthened their democratic institutions (Figure 24). In Ecuador, Civil Liberties and Checks on Government (including Judicial Independence and Effective Parliament) have improved in the last two governments. The Dominican Republic has experienced improvements in seven subattributes, including Civil Liberties, Media Integrity, Judicial Independence and Access to Justice.

Figure 25 – Democratic performance in the Americas, 2021Democratic performance in the Americas, 2021

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

2.4.2 Beleaguered democracy

While the Americas is overwhelmingly democratic, most countries’ performance has been mid-range or lower; the average score across all subattributes for all democracies is slightly lower than the average in 2010.

A third of countries have experienced declines in at least three subattributes in the last two years, including Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador (see Box 10), Guatemala and the USA. In Bolivia, the elected government has begun baseless criminal proceedings against all opposition leaders and even against election officials who oversaw the 2020 vote. (130) In Guatemala, Impartial Administration and Checks on Government scores have dropped further, with indications of severe government corruption and politicians’ involvement in organized crime (131) resulting in at least 13 former prosecutors now in exile. (132)

Figure 26 – Latin American countries with the most declines in 2020 or 2021, by subattributeLatin American countries with the most declines in 2020 or 2021, by subattribute

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

In addition, Brazil and the USA are backsliding democracies. In Brazil, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and Clean Elections scores have dropped in the last few years. The growing influence of the military in politics and the state (133) and President Jair Bolsonaro’s attacks on the country’s election system are causes for concern. (134) Attacks on US democracy during the Trump presidency, (135) polarization and threats to long- established rights (such as the overturning of Roe v. Wade on abortion rights) (136) continue.

Box 10 – El Salvador moves towards authoritarianism

In the Global State of Democracy in the Americas 2021 report, International IDEA called for ‘careful attention to be paid to the evolution of the democratic status of El Salvador’, (137) which declined from a mid-performing to a weak democracy in 2020. This trend has worsened in 2021, with significant declines in key indicators such as Civil Liberties, Effective Parliament and Judicial Independence. However, El Salvador’s situation has worsened further; it is likely to be classified as hybrid next year based on 2022 data.

Last year’s report highlighted attacks on the rule of law, through measures such as ‘the full dismissal of the magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Attorney General, or the expulsion from the country of journalists belonging to media criticism of the government’. (138) The 2021 report also focused on the decision of the Constitutional Chamber, with new members selected by the current government, to issue a ruling that authorizes presidential re-election. This decision allowed Nayib Bukele to announce, in September 2022, his plan to run for re-election in 2024, in violation of the Salvadoran Constitution (articles 75, 88 and 131 expressly prohibit immediate presidential re-election).

The six-time extension of the state of emergency has led to arbitrary arrests and severe restrictions on press freedom, actions that have been seriously questioned by human rights organizations. (139) Amnesty International has accused the Bukele government of immersing its country ‘in a human rights crisis’, pointing to its authorities as authors of ‘widespread and flagrant violations of human rights, and criminalizing people in poverty’. (140)

The region is also experiencing worrying restrictions on Fundamental Rights and Checks on Government (Figure 27). Across the region, harassment and persecution of, and violence against journalists and media outlets are on the rise. In 2022 alone, authorities raided the offices of La Prensa, Nicaragua’s oldest newspaper, (141) arrested journalist José Rubén Zamora in Guatemala (142) and harassed journalist Carlos Loret de Mola in Mexico, in a period when violence against journalists is the highest ever in the country. (143) More journalists have been killed in Mexico so far in 2022 than anywhere else in the world. (144)

Figure 27 – Percentage of countries with declines in at least one subattribute, Americas 1980–2021Percentage of countries with declines in at least one subattribute, Americas 1980–2021

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.

Populist authoritarian leaders are increasingly attempting to dismantle democracy from within after being democratically elected. (145) These leaders understand people’s frustrations and offer seemingly easy solutions for complex problems such as poverty, inequality and lack of opportunity. However, once in power, instead of delivering inclusive new social contracts, they promote the opposite and weaken rights and key democratic institutions such as legislatures, courts and election bodies. For example, Mexican President López Obrador and his party have tried to weaken several autonomous constitutional bodies, including the National Electoral Institute (146) and local electoral institutes, by slashing their budgets and questioning their relevance. (147) In Brazil, President Bolsonaro has raised baseless allegations against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the electronic voting system. (148) In the USA, Donald Trump’s ‘big lie’ about the 2020 election continues to spread. (149) Similar actions can be observed in Peru, where allegations of fraud in the aftermath of President Pedro Castillo’s victory weakened public trust in the EMB. (150) These actions not only damage institutions; they have also been used to pressure elected officials, destabilize governments and condone violence. In other regions, such allegations have been used to justify coups d’état. (151)

Box 11 – Honduras

In Honduras, historically disadvantaged groups have pushed to renew the social contract through activism that targets longstanding challenges to the protection of human rights.

Six years after human rights defender Berta Caceres was murdered for her work protecting the environment and the rights of the Lenca people, stakeholders have increased pressure on the government to accede to the 2018 Escazu Agreement. (152) This is particularly relevant in a country where over 130 defenders of the environment have been killed since 2009, according to the government’s own records. (153) Symbolically, Congress declared Caceres a national hero this year, (154) but the government still claims implementation challenges impede immediate accession (155) to the agreement on which environmental activists depend for the free and safe exercise of their work, and for accountability in case of abuses.

Women’s rights organizations continue to push for the decriminalization of abortion, undeterred by a 2021 constitutional amendment that further consolidated its absolute prohibition. (156) In 2021, the ‘Somos Muchas’ platform presented a judicial appeal, pleading for decriminalization in certain circumstances. (157) The case is currently under consideration in the Supreme Court, and different organizations have presented amicus briefs this year with a view to continue their advocacy. (158)

LGBTQIA+ activists face challenges associated with attaining further protections against hate crimes and legalizing same-sex marriage. (159) Yet President Xiomara Castro issued an apology for the state’s responsibility for the 2009 murder of Vicky Hernandez, a trans woman activist. This was in accordance with a judgment against Honduras by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In compliance with the ruling, President Castro announced that trans people will be allowed to revise their documents to match their gender identity. (160)

Many have set their hopes on President Castro delivering on her campaign promises, which included a relatively progressive rights agenda and a social equality platform. (161) As the country’s first female president she undoubtedly faces further scrutiny in the implementation of rights-based and feminist policies to address persistent inequalities and gender-based discrimination and violence. (162)

2.4.3 Renewing the social contract

Latin America is the most unequal and violent region in the world. (163) One-third of its population lives in poverty, (164) and the Covid-19 pandemic caused major economic damage. The drop in per capita GDP is not expected to recover to pre-pandemic levels until 2023–2024. (165) The economic and social fallouts of the pandemic have disproportionately affected informal workers. According to recent International Labour Organization estimates, more than 60 per cent of workers across Latin America are informally employed. (166) The region’s informal economy is associated with greater inequality and weaker governance, (167) viewed as an expression of a lack of trust in public institutions with limited access to social security. (168)

Governments in the region have also failed to adequately protect their citizens. A stunning 47.5 per cent of the region’s population has no social protection for pensions, (169) and those who receive them do not get enough. In Chile, 82 per cent of the population that gets a pension receives less than minimum wage. (170)
In addition, the latest available data show that the average health expenditure in Latin America is well below the global average. (171) As in the rest of the world, the marginalized and poor suffer the most. These challenges have fuelled frustration and discontent in the region. The number of massive protests (of over 10,000 participants) has almost doubled, (172) from 44 between 2013 and 2016 to 71 between 2017 and 2020. (173)

This discontent is reflected at the ballot box. Between 2018 and 2022, 76 per cent of all national-level elections in Latin America and the Caribbean resulted in an opposition victory. In Colombia, citizens recently elected a left-wing president for the first time in history. (174)

Figure 28 – Incumbent defeats in Latin America, 2018–2022Incumbent defeats in Latin America, 2018–2022

Notes: Costa Rica and Barbados have had two elections since 2018, one of which resulted in a change of government. Bolivia had a temporary change of government in 2019 with the resignation of President Morales. Morales’ Movement for Socialism was reinstated as the ruling party following the 2020 election. Haiti has not held an election since 2016; the election scheduled for 2021 has been postponed indefinitely.

Source: Research by the Democracy Assessment Unit, International IDEA.

In Chile, discontent has been channelled into a constitutional process that used participatory mechanisms and sought to strengthen social and economic rights, gender equality and environmental protection, and to highlight the plurinational character of the state. (175) Nevertheless, the referendum on 4 September 2022 resulted in an overwhelming rejection of the new constitution. Electors seem to favour a more moderate approach to some of the profound changes proposed, (176) including on Indigenous peoples’ rights. Surveys showed contentious reactions to the provisions on quotas to ensure political representation, self-determination and self-government of Indigenous peoples. Some—including members of Indigenous communities—expressed concerns about whether the measures would be efficient or bring about division. (177)

President Boric’s subsequent call on Congress to present a timetable for the drafting of a new constitution that is acceptable to the majority of citizens, (178) as well as modifications to his cabinet following the results, (179) illustrates the government‘s recognition that the renewal of the social contract must take into account the diverse views of the population. Before the UN’s General Assembly, President Boric emphasized that, despite the result, demands for change were addressed in a constitutional manner, and not through violence as they had been in the past. (180)

In the USA, recent mass mobilizations called for government action on climate change. (181) Political compromises facilitated the inclusion of important energy and climate provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, albeit weaker measures than the administration had pledged. (182) A boom in the gig economy during the pandemic also contributed to increased demands for labour protection in a sector in which migrants and people of colour are the most affected; the Labor Department is currently considering these demands. (183) Backlash against the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which effectively overturned the reproductive rights protected by Roe v. Wade, also led to protests to prevent further rollbacks in states such as Kansas, where a referendum’s results conveyed discontent with a judicial decision viewed as detached from public opinion. (184)

2.4.4 Conclusion

Recent developments in the Americas show that governments and institutions at all levels must listen to citizens, include them in their decision making, and work with them to ensure that social contracts remain valid or are adequately renewed to address popular demands. Community organizers and grassroots movements in the region will continue to mobilize to influence policymakers to that end. This is evident in the Green Wave movement that has delivered ground-breaking achievements
for abortion rights in Latin America, (185) despite some setbacks in the region due to conservative and religious influence. (186) The traction gained in the past few years in Argentina, Mexico and, most recently, Colombia, has also invigorated local activism in countries where women face greater restrictions on their reproductive rights. (187) The Feminist Recovery Plan for Canada, which features an intersectional approach to economic reactivation, exemplifies an inclusive new social contract. (188) Activists and citizens expect to be heard by their institutions; if they are not, this could lead to further discontent. The social contract needs to be revised in an inclusive way; for this, democracy is an ally, not an obstacle. (189)

Chapter 3 – Recommendations

3.1. GLOBAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Governments should prioritize the implementation and enforcement of strategies and policies that reduce corruption and rebuild public trust.
    • Social contracts are based on mutual trust. Accountability and transparency are essential prerequisites for successfully renewed social contracts.
    • Adopting recommendations by regional anti- corruption bodies, such as GRECO in Europe, the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption in the Americas, and the Open Government Partnership, are strong first steps.
  • Governments, in close partnership with civil society actors, must ensure the protection of Freedom of Expression, especially online, as enshrined in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in general comments 25 and 34.
    • Country-based legislation should be adapted and updated to take the realities of digital communications into account.
    • Legal frameworks protecting Freedom of Expression should be enlarged and reinforced by synchronizing them with new digital rights, such as right to privacy or to accessible Internet.
    • Online content moderation legislation should effectively prevent hate speech and incitement to violence without being overly restrictive. Such regulations should not cripple market innovation by establishing complex and costly requirements that only large social media companies can fulfil.
    • The Government of Spain’s Charter of Digital Rights extensively covers the protection of Freedom of Expression online, among and synchronized with other digital rights.
  • Governments and civil society organizations should offer youth dedicated spaces, including in established bilateral and multilateral forums, to meaningfully participate in politics and help develop policies that impact them. Youth advisory councils at the Council of Europe and at the subnational levels in Canada and Australia could serve as models.
  • Governments and, when relevant, international partners and organizations, must prioritize addressing all forms of inequality, especially in light of inflation and the rising cost of living. Traditionally marginalized groups’ needs must be at the centre of activities such as citizen assemblies, new legislation, local dialogue and mobilization, climate action and other such efforts.
    • Colombia’s designation of the Andes-Amazon rainforest as a civil society nature reserve allows Indigenous women to repurpose their knowledge of medicinal plants, gardening, artisanship, women’s self-care and ecological stewardship. (190)
    • In response to the need for modernized childcare options, highlighted during the pandemic, the development of community-based childcare centres is critical. Such centres are already enabling more mothers to earn incomes in Cambodia, (191) Malawi, (192) Bangladesh and other countries.
  • Regional organizations should utilize bilateral and multilateral relationships to hold countries to the highest democratic standards.
    • Such organizations should take a firm public stance against democratically illegitimate governments. They should regularly convene multisector stakeholders who can share lessons learned across regions and develop common and contextually appropriate goals for democratic growth and innovation.
    • Human rights experts from the UN and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have collaborated to call attention to Nicaragua’s repression of its civic space through joint statements. (193) The Commission established a Special Monitoring Mechanism for Nicaragua in 2018; its work documenting rights violations has increased international awareness of the actions that undermine the rule of law and weaken the liberties of a democratic state. (194)
  • International actors should re-commit to supporting electoral integrity, which is the bedrock of democracy.
    • Donors and assistance organizations should focus on helping domestic actors to mitigate vulnerabilities in the electoral cycle, especially those that impact public perceptions of electoral credibility.
    • Peer-to-peer learning across borders, and cooperation between EMBs and judicial institutions, can effectively improve electoral integrity. Regional EMB networks, such as the Organization of Arab Electoral Management Bodies, are good examples of such peer learning and cooperation. (195)

3.2. REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Africa and West Asia

  • Regional bodies and member states should condemn coup leaders as politically illegitimate. They should further demonstrate their rejection of such actions by fully implementing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the African Peer Review Mechanism, and the relevant norms and instruments, including the African Peace and Security Architecture and African Governance Architecture frameworks, as well as the resolutions of the Malabo Summit on combatting unconstitutional changes of government. At the same time, due consideration must be given to the causes of coups d’état and the development of early warning systems, as longer processes of democratic decline that often presage coups have tended to attract less attention.
  • Donors must be more assertive in their responses to the shrinking civic space in Africa. (196) The collective reinforcement of relevant human rights norms in intergovernmental forums such as the African Union is particularly important.
    • Donors should strengthen their support to African civil society organizations by developing flexible modes of funding that can adapt to changing contexts and which reflect civil society organizations’ administrative capacity limitations.
    • The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency’s results-based funding, which focuses on results and objectives rather than a fixed set of activities, has enabled it to be an agile and effective donor in contexts of closing civic space. (197)

Asia and the Pacific

  • Governments in the region should roll back and limit the spread of legislation that undermines freedom of expression and privacy under the guise of security and fighting disinformation. In addition, they should develop legislation that is aligned with international standards to protect data privacy and secure the treatment and storage of personal data, ideally with a human rights focus. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation and the standards set by the UN Human Rights Council are good benchmarks.
  • Donors should focus on empowering civil society groups and other independent actors that are mobilizing public demonstrations and protests for change. Demands must be channelled into meaningful political dialogue, and mechanisms should be created through which people’s grievances are heard and documented. Transparent oversight structures should also be developed that can monitor responses and action. Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya political party, which grew out of mass protests, will likely generate important lessons learned.
  • Donors and democracy assistance organizations should support states’ capacities regarding oversight of security forces, anti-corruption and tackling election-related disinformation. They should pay special attention to weak and mid-performing democracies that are making slow but steady progress such as Fiji, the Maldives and Pakistan.
  • Regional bodies, especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should uphold the highest standards of democracy and human rights by fully implementing the 2009 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and reinforcing the role of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. ASEAN member states should energetically condemn the crimes committed by the junta in Myanmar.

Europe

  • Donors to European countries that are most vulnerable to Russian aggression and influence should prioritize flexible and comprehensive support to domestic pro-democracy actors. This is especially important for civil society watchdog organizations focused on the integrity of the electoral process, the information environment and corruption, as these aspects have proven to be backdoors for Russian influence operations designed to destabilize democracy.
  • Regional bodies and civil society organizations should lead the expansion of regional cooperation
    in support of media integrity in line with article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, including in responses to violations of media freedoms, and through swift passage and implementation of the European Media Freedom Act.
  • The EU, donor organizations and public authorities should regularly invest more resources in experimenting with, supporting and building knowledge around innovative participation mechanisms to identify forms that work in different contexts. More attention is also needed to ensure that these mechanisms are as inclusive as possible and that there are systems in place to channel recommendations into policy action. European authorities at the local, regional and national
    levels should provide increasing decision-making power to successful initiatives that enhance public participation.
    • Innovative participation mechanisms have included the European Home Parliaments initiative, which allows small groups of citizens to debate EU policy issues and provides a direct link with EU politicians as the results are aggregated and submitted to policymakers.
    • The European Platform for Participatory Budgeting for Youth was designed to promote coordination between selected cities (members of the European Youth Capitals network) to encourage young people to engage in local participatory budgeting mechanisms.

The Americas

  • National human rights institutions and government agencies should develop participatory mechanisms through which protesters’ demands can be discussed and acted upon, if necessary.
    • Civil society groups and activists should be consulted and involved in defining these mechanisms’ methods of work and schedule of meetings, consultations and agreements.
    • Canada’s Human Rights Commission has taken steps to tap into participatory processes to guide decision making on social issues. For example, the Federal Housing Advocate, housed at the Commission, relies on public submissions from Canadians suffering housing issues and homelessness to inform policy recommendations.
  • In times of declining trust in institutions and disinformation, election bodies must update their civic education efforts. Civic education programmes and campaigns should go beyond technical information about how elections work to focus more on ‘citizenship building’ with the visibility, promotion and replication of successful citizen participation experiences and lessons learned. Election bodies also need to socialize people on the importance of key democratic principles, from the importance of participation to the need to be critical and sceptical. This effort should consider wider audiences and underrepresented groups, such as Indigenous peoples, youth, persons with disabilities and persons belonging to the LGBTQIA+ community.
    • Peru’s National Office of Electoral Processes conducts comprehensive electoral voter education and civic education programmes on matters related to the promotion of democratic elections. (198)
    • Mexico’s National Electoral Institute developed a Civic Culture Strategy that aims to empower citizens and increase their participation in public debate, advocacy and strengthening the accountability of political institutions. (199)
    •  Panama’s Electoral Tribunal has promoted civic education through a Digital Ethical Pact that seeks to engage citizens in the responsible use of social media during elections. (200)
  • It is widely known that for elections to be credible, EMBs should follow fundamental guiding principles. (201) Chief among these is autonomy: EMB members must act independently, and the government must not unduly interfere in their decisions. There are several options for building structurally independent EMBs, including a law that creates an autonomous institution that is entitled to a fixed percentage of the national budget. Another option is to establish an election civil service with members appointed through a transparent and impartial process.
    •  A country’s legal framework and EMB design have limits. It is becoming increasingly important for other democratic institutions— from intergovernmental organizations to local civil society—to raise their voices when EMBs are under attack. Governments and electoral assistance organizations should support forums such as the Summit for Electoral Democracy, (202) which has issued a statement advocating EMB autonomy.
    • International bodies, including the UN Human Rights Council and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, should
      consider creating a Special Rapporteur on the independence of EMBs, similar to current initiatives supporting the independence of judges (203) or freedom of opinion and expression. (204)

Chapter 4 – Conclusion

Democracies are declining or stagnating in the face of a rapidly changing global context. Even countries previously considered ‘established’ democracies have vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored. At the same time, democratic regimes have not convincingly made the case that they can deliver what people need. Current challenges, such as an impending recession, the rising cost of living and the increasingly severe effects of climate change highlight this weakness. People’s faith in the importance and effectiveness of democratic institutions is thus decreasing to a worrying extent.

The world is at a critical crossroads. Given current trends, democracies are under urgent pressure to deliver. Fortunately, as this report details, efforts are already underway to put the appropriate and corresponding mechanisms in place. One key mechanism is the social contract, which must be reconceptualized to reflect a new reality and respond to new and evolving public needs and demands. Around the world, groups are attempting this reconceptualization through a variety of channels, including new constitutions, citizens’ assemblies, local political associations and governmental dialogue mechanisms.

Governments, civil society, media, expert groups, academics and individuals each have a role to play in supporting and participating in the renovation of social contracts. Our collective ability to come together, locally and internationally, to pursue the citizen-centred design of these contracts will determine the fate of democracy in the years to come.

About International IDEA

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.

WHAT DO WE DO?

In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion, conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of work.

International IDEA provides analyses of global and regional democratic trends; produces comparative knowledge on democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity building on reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.

WHERE DO WE WORK?

Our headquarters are located in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union institutions.

<https://www.idea.int>

About the Global State of Democracy initiative

International IDEA launched the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) initiative in 2016. This Initiative provides evidence-based and balanced analysis and data on the state and quality of democracy globally and for 173 countries across all regions of the world. It aims to contribute to the public debate on democracy and inform policy interventions to strengthen democracy. Its main products include the annual Global State of Democracy report, the annual Global State of Democracy indices, the monthly Democracy Tracker, In Focus reports, blogs and op-eds.

GSOD REPORT

International IDEA’s The Global State of Democracy Report aims to influence the global debate and analyses current trends and challenges to democracy. It offers specific policy recommendations to spark new and innovative thinking for policymakers, governments and civil society organizations supporting democracy.

<https://www.idea.int/gsod>

GSOD INDICES

The Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices) quantitatively measure democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975– 2021. They do not provide a single index of democracy.
They produce data for 173 countries across the globe. The GSoD Indices are based on 116 individual indicators devised by various scholars and organizations using different types of sources. The GSoD indices consist of attribute and subattribute scores per country per year for the period 1975–2021.

<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/democracy-indices>

DEMOCRACY TRACKER

The Democracy Tracker provides comprehensive qualitative data on the state of democracy and human rights in 173 countries. The tool monitors and flags events, highlighting those that are significant enough to impact the status quo of each country. It provides policymakers and other stakeholders with timely analysis of the events and developments that merit attention and intervention.

<https://www.idea.int/democracytracker>

1.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2021/22 (New York: UNDP, 2022, <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2021-22>, accessed 29 September 2022

2.

United Nations, Our Common Agenda: Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 2021), p. 22

3.

Shafik., M., ‘What we owe each other: A new social contract for a better society’, International Monetary Fund, April 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691220277>

4.

United Nations, Our Common Agenda, p. 14

5.

‘Africa’s strongmen news, research and analysis’, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/global/topics/ africas-strongmen-73814>, accessed 29 September 2022

6.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Global protest tracker, [n.d.], <https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker>, accessed 23 September 2022

7.

R. Inglehart, C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin and B. Puranen (eds), ‘World Values Survey: All Rounds—Country-Pooled Datafile Version’, JD Systems Institute, 2014, <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp>, accessed 1 November 2022

8.

Landler, M., Bennhold, K. and Stevis-Gridneff, M., ‘How the West marshaled a stunning show of unity against Russia,’ The New York Times, 5 March 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/05/world/europe/russia-ukraine-invasion-sanctions.html>, accessed 29 September 2022

9.

Chadwick, V., ‘Sweden pulls $1b in foreign aid for ukrainian refugees at home’, Devex, 5 May 2022, <https://www.devex. com/news/sponsored/sweden-pulls-1b-in-foreign-aid-for- ukrainian-refugees-at-home-103164>, accessed 3 October 2022

10.

Small, J., ‘Mexico, Brazil leaders ignore their UN delegates, refuse to sanction Russia’, Newsweek, 4 March 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/mexico-brazil-leaders- ignore-their-un-delegates-refuse-sanction-russia-1685001>, accessed 29 September 2022

11.

Press, A., ‘WHO chief blames racism for greater focus on Ukraine than Ethiopia’, The Guardian, 13 April 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/13/who-chief-tedros-ukraine-ethiopia-tigray>, accessed 29 September 2022

12.

Cardoso, F. H., ‘Industrialization, dependency, and power in Latin America’, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 17 (1972), pp. 79–95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41035184>, accessed 28 October 2022;
Matunhu, J., ‘A critique of modernization and dependency theories in Africa: Critical assessment’, African Journal
of History and Culture, 3/5 (2011), pp. 65–72, <https://academicjournals.org/article/article1381858116_Matunhu.pdf>, accessed 28 October 2022

13.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A., ‘The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation’, American Economic Review, 91/5 (2001), pp. 1369–401, <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1369>

14.

Bach, D. C., ‘Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism: Comparative trajectories and readings’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 49/3 (2011), pp. 275–94, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2011.582731>

15.

Pitcher, A., Moran, M. H. and Johnston, M., ‘Rethinking patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in Africa’, African Studies Review, 52/1 (2009), pp. 125–56, <https://doi.org/10.1353/arw.0.0163>

16.

The Guardian, ‘Armed forces open fire in crackdown on anti- monarchy protests in Eswatini’, 29 June 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/29/soldiers-deployed- eswatini-crackdown-protests>, accessed 4 October 2022

17.

Hanspal, J. and Nyabor, J., ‘Can Ghana’s new wave of protesters force president Akufo-Addo to change course?’, The Africa Report, 11 July 2022, <https://www.theafricareport.com/221660/can-ghanas-new-wave-of-protesters-force-president-akufo-addo-to-change-course>, accessed 4 October 2022

18.

Reuters, ‘Libyan protest movement says it will step up its campaign’, 3 July 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/libyan-protest-group-says-rallies-should-go-until-goals-achieved-2022-07-02>, accessed 4 October 2022

19.

Osman, M., ‘Sudan: Voices of protesters should be heard, not sidelined’, Human Rights Watch, 28 June 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/28/sudan-voices-protesters-should-be-heard-not-sidelined>, accessed 4 October 2022

20.

Gramlich, J., ‘For World Population Day, a look at the countries with the biggest projected gains—and losses— by 2100’, Pew Research Center, 10 July 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/10/for-world-population-day-a-look-at-the-countries-with-the-biggest-projected-gains-and-losses-by-2100>, accessed 12 August 2022

21.

World Meteorological Organization, State of the Climate in Africa: 2020 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 2021), <https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_ id=10929>, accessed 12 August 2022

22.

Varadhan, S., Reid, H., Dausen, N., Saul, J., and Chestney, N., ‘Coal rush! Energy crisis fires global hunt for polluting fuel’, Reuters, 20 September 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/coal-rush-energy-crisis-fires-global-hunt-polluting-fuel-2022-09-20>, accessed 4 October 2022

23.

Beblawi, H., ‘The rentier state in the Arab world’, in H. Beblawi and G. Luciani (eds), The Rentier State (New York: Routledge, 2015), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315684864>

24.

Erdmann, G. and Engel, U., ‘Neopatrimonialism revisited: Beyond a catch-all concept’, GIGA Research Program: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems, 16 (2006), <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.909183>

25.

The GSoD Indices measure only the quality of democracy within the internationally recognized territory of the state, and do not take state actions regarding non-citizens into account. This is particularly notable in the case of Israel. The state has a high level of democratic quality with respect to its Jewish citizens (and defines itself as a ‘Jewish and democratic state’), but frequently engages in actions that violate the rights of Palestinians and Arab Israelis. A recent UN report determined that Israel’s actions in the occupied territories reaches the standards under international law to be classified as the international crime of apartheid. In this way, Israel’s practice of democracy is severely flawed. Lynk, M., ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967’, A/ HRC/49/87, 21 March 2022, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-palestinian-territories-occupied-since-1967-report-a-hrc-49-87-advance-unedited-version>, accessed 17 October 2022

26.

Mahmalat, M., Atallah, S., Zoughaib, S. and Maktabi, W., ‘When elections don’t matter? How new parliamentarians can improve the politics of power-sharing arrangements’, Middle East Institute, 19 July 2022, <https://www.mei. edu/publications/when-elections-dont-matter-how-new-parliamentarians-can-improve-politics-power-sharing>, accessed 15 September 2022

27.

Radio France Internationale, ‘Elections in Lebanon: Independents win at least 13 seats: results’, 17 May 2022, <https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20220517-elections-in-lebanon-independents-win-at-least-13-seats-results>, accessed 12 October 2022

28.

Vakil, S., ‘Iran protests highlight its crisis of legitimacy’, Chatham House, 28 September 2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/09/iran-protests-highlight-its-crisis-legitimacy>, accessed 4 October 2022;
Al Jazeera, ‘Protests enter 15th day in Iran amid lingering internet curbs’, 1 October 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/1/protests-enter-15th-day-in-iran-amid-lingering-internet-curbs>, accessed 4 October 2022

29.

Thomas, M., ‘Qatar deports migrant workers after wage protest’, BBC News, 23 August 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62645350>, accessed 4 October 2022

30.

Associated Press and Reuters, ‘Denmark unveil World Cup “protest” kits criticising Qatar’s human rights record’, The Guardian, 28 September 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/sep/28/denmark-unveil-world-cup-protest-kits-over-qatar-human-rights-record>, accessed 4 October 2022

31.

Nafti, H., ‘La tunisie malade de la gestion politicienne de la pandémie’ [Tunisia sick of the political management of the pandemic], Middle East Eye, 16 March 2021, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/decryptages/coronavirus-tunisie-gestion-pandemie-gouvernement-mechichi-ennahdha-crise- politique-sanitaire>, accessed 12 October 2022;
Mimouna, A., ‘La classe moyenne s’est évaporée: les tunisiens dénoncent la hausse du coût de la vie’ [The middle class has evaporated: Tunisians denounce the rise in the cost of living], Middle East Eye, 17 June 2021, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/tunisie-economie-inflation-cherte-vie-societe-subventions-classe-moyenne>, accessed 12 October 2022

32.

Reuters, ‘Tunisia’s president to ignore parts of the constitution and rule by decree’, The Guardian, 22 September 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/22/tunisias-president-to-ignore-parts-of-the-constitution-and-rule-by-decree>, accessed 12 October 2022

33.

International Commission of Jurists, ‘Codifying Autocracy: The Proposed Tunisian Constitution in Light of International Law and Standards’, 2022, <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Tunisia-proposed-new-constitution-Legal-briefing-2022-ENG.pdf>, accessed 19 August 2022;
Al-Ali, Z., ‘Tunisia’s draft constitution solidifies one-man rule’, The Washington Post, 8 July 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/08/tunisia-saied-coup-constitution-backsliding-democracy>, accessed 12 October 2022

34.

The World Bank, Iraq Economic Monitor: Navigating the Perfect Storm, May 2020, <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/446201588465646751/iraq-economic-monitor-navigating-the-perfect-storm-redux>, accessed 19 October 2022

35.

Alkaini, Z., ‘Iraq’s Tishreen protest movement: The exceptional domestic pressure tool’, Arab Center Washington DC, 10 November 2021 <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/iraqs-tishreen-protest-movement-the-exceptional-domestic-pressure-tool>, accessed 19 October 2022

36.

Alkhudary, T., ‘The fragmentation of Iraq’s “protest parties” attests to the Muhasasa system’s resilience’, 7 June 2022, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2022/06/07/the-fragmentation-of-iraqs-protest-parties-attests-to-the-muhasasa-systems-resilience>, accessed 19 October 2022

37.

Arab Barometer, ‘Democracy in the Middle East and North Africa’, July 2022, <https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVII_Governance_Report-EN-1.pdf>, accessed 19 October 2022

38.

Tabaqchali, A., ‘How demographics erode the patronage buying power of Iraq’s Muhasasa Ta’ifia’, Arab Reform Initiative, 30 July 2020, <https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/how-demographics-erode-the-patronage-buying-power-of-iraqs-muhasasa-taifia>, accessed 27 October 2022

39.

Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, [n.d.], <https://www.bayancenter.org/en>, accessed 28 October 2022

40.

Rewaq Baghdad Center, [n.d.], <https://rewaqbaghdad.org/home/ViewArticles/19>, accessed 28 October 2022

41.

Rewaq Baghdad Center, ‘I am the Parliament’ App, [n.d.], <https://iamtheparliament.com>, accessed 1 November 2022

42.

Carter Center, Analyzing Zambia’s 2021 General Elections: Final Report (Atlanta: Carter Center, 2021), <https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/zambia-final-report-2021.pdf>, accessed 19 August 2022;
African Union, ‘African Union Election Observation Mission to the 12 August 2021 General Elections in Zambia statement of preliminary findings’, 2021, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20210814/aueom-statement-preliminary-findings-zambias-2021-general-elections>, accessed 19 August 2022

43.

Topona, E., ‘Niger: interview exclusive de Mahamane Ousmane avec la DW’ [Niger: Mahamane Ousmane’s exclusive interview with DW], Deutsche Welle, 27 February 2021, <https://www.dw.com/fr/niger-interview-exclusive-de-mahamane-ousmane-avec-la-dw/a-56725017>, accessed 17 October 2022

44.

Zandonini, G., ‘Mohammed Bazoum sworn in as Niger’s president amid tensions’, Al Jazeera, 2 April 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/2/niger-president-to-be-sworn-in-after-attempted-coup>, accessed 17 October 2022

45.

For more analysis of recent coups, see: Hudson, A. and Towriss, D., ‘When do you call a seizure of power a coup, and why does it matter?’, International IDEA blog, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/blog/explainer-when-do-you-call-seizure-power-coup-and-why-does-it-matter>, accessed 18 October 2022

46.

CIVICUS, People Power under Attack 2021: A Report Based on Data from the CIVICUS Monitor, 2021 <https://civicus.contentfiles.net/media/assets/file/2021GlobalReport.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2022

47.

Government of the Republic of The Gambia, ‘The Gambia National Development Plan’, 2018, <https://www.thegambiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/1.-The-Gambia-National-Development-Plan-2018-2021-Full-Version.pdf>, accessed 13 October 2022

48.

Institute for Security Studies Africa, ‘The democratisation process in The Gambia remains fragile’, 2019, <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/the-democratisation-process-in-the-gambia-remains-fragile>, accessed 13 October 2022

49.

European Union Election Observation Mission Kenya, ‘Fundamental freedoms respected in Kenya’s general elections, but procedural shortcomings demonstrate the need for improvements’, 11 August 2022, <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU%20EOM%20Kenya%202022%20Preliminary%20Statement%2011%20 August%202022.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2022

50.

Songa, A. and Tadesse Shiferaw, L., ‘Kenya’s watershed election: Implications for EU policy’, Carnegie Europe, 6 October 2022, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/10/06/kenya-s-watershed-election-implications-for-eu-policy-pub-88060>, accessed 12 October 2022;
Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘The Angaza movement preliminary observations on the 2022 elections’, 19 August 2022, <https://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/769-the-angaza-movement-preliminary-observations-on-the-2022-elections.html>, accessed 12 October 2022

51.

International Republican Institute, ‘Preliminary statement of initial findings and recommendations of the IRI/NDI international election observer mission to Kenya’s August 9, 2022 general elections’, 11 August 2022, <https://www.iri.org/resources/preliminary-statement-of-initial-findings-and-recommendations-of-the-iri-ndi-international-election-observer-mission-to-kenyas-august-9-2022-general-elections>, accessed 12 October 2022;
Songa, A. and Tadesse Shiferaw, L., ‘Kenya’s watershed election: Implications for EU policy’, Carnegie Europe, 6 October 2022, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/10/06/kenya-s-watershed-election-implications-for-eu-policy-pub-88060>, accessed 12 October 2022

52.

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, ‘Declaration of Results for the Election of President of the Republic of Kenya at the National Tallying Centre’, 2022, <https://www.iebc.or.ke/uploads/resources/QLTlLJx0Vr.pdf>, accessed 29 September 2022

53.

Ombuor, R., ‘Kenya’s election is being lauded as “historic” for women—that’s not true, Open Democracy, 23 August 2022, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/kenya-election-women-history-representation>, accessed 15 September 2022

54.

UNDP, ‘Food, fuel, finance: The global impact of the war in Ukraine’, 24 August 2022, <https://stories.undp.org/food-fuel- finance>, accessed 1 September 2022;
United Nations, ‘Middle East and North Africa: Addressing highest rates of youth unemployment in the world’, 23 May 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118842>, accessed 1 September 2022

55.

Jalloh, A.-B., ‘Why democracy in Africa needs a rethink’, Deutsche Welle, 28 January 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-why-democracy-in-africa-needs-rethinking/a-60594113>, accessed 1 September 2022

56.

United Nations, ‘Middle East and North Africa: Addressing highest rates of youth unemployment in the world’, 23 May 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1118842>, accessed 1 September 2022

57.

Mattes, R., ‘Democracy in Africa: Demand, Supply, and the « Dissatisfied Democrat »’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 54, February, 2019, <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r7_policypaperno54_africans_views_of_democracy1.pdf>, accessed 1 September 2022

58.

Krönke, M., ‘Broad Support for Multiparty Elections, Little Faith in Electoral Institutions: Uganda in Comparative Perspective’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 79, February 2022, <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp79-broad-support-multiparty-elections-little-faith-electoral-institutions-uganda>, accessed 5 September 2022;
Krönke, M. and Kakumba, M. R., ‘Unresponsive and Corrupt? Ugandan MPs Hold Key to How Citizens Perceive Them’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 81, August 2022, <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp81-unresponsive-and-corrupt-ugandan-mps-hold-key-to-how-citizens-perceive-them>, accessed 15 September 2022

59.

Afrobarometer, ‘Uganda SDG scorecard’, 12 July 2021, <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/uganda-sdg-scorecard>, accessed 5 September 2022

60.

Tumushabe, G. and Kiija, J., Uganda’s Political Transition Scenarios to 2026 and beyond: The Crester Crane, the Storm in the Teacup or the Warrior Mad King?, GLISS Policy Research Paper Series, 2021, <https://www.glissafrica.org/storage/publications/June2022/vk3rWdviS7dndy7yBeFz.pdf>, accessed 28 October 2022;
Interview with Godber Tumushabe by phone, 3 October 2022

61.

Helle, S.-E. and Rakner, L., ‘The impact of elections: The case of Uganda’, in J. Gerschewski and C. H. Stefes (eds), Crisis in Autocratic Regimes (Boulder, CO: Rienner Publishers, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781626377257-007>

62.

Wilkins, S., Vokes, R. and Khisa, M., ‘Briefing: Contextualizing the Bobi Wine factor in Uganda’s 2021 elections’, African Affairs, 120/481 (2021), pp. 629–43, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adab024>

63.

Interview with David Lewis Rubongoya by phone, 22 August 2022

64.

Interview with Godber Tumushabe by phone, 3 October 2022; Interview with Henry Muguzi, Felix Kafuuma and Abel Esuru of Political Finance Africa by phone, 5 October 2022; Interview with Bwambale Asiimwe Micheal by phone, 30 September 2022;
Human Rights Watch, ‘Uganda: Harassment of civil society groups’, 27 August 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/27/uganda-harassment-civil-society-groups>, accessed 6 October 2022

65.

Thiery, W. et al., ‘Intergenerational inequities in exposure to climate extremes’, Science, 374/6564 (2021), pp. 158–60, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abi7339>

66.

Modeer, U. and Winja Otieno, V., ‘Tapping into the power of young people for climate action’, UNDP blog, 12 August 2022, <https://www.undp.org/blog/tapping-power-young-people-climate-action>, accessed 19 October 2022

67.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Conference of the Parties (COP)’, [n.d.], <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop>, accessed 19 October 2022

68.

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), ‘SAIIA youth’, [n.d.], <https://saiia.org.za/youth>, accessed 19 October 2022

69.

Population data from the World Bank and Taiwan monthly official estimates, [n.d.], <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>, accessed 28 October 2022

70.

Baral, B., ‘Nepal ratified the MCC compact. What now?’, The Diplomat, 14 March 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/nepal-ratified-the-mcc-compact-what-now>, accessed 4 October 2022

71.

BBC News, ‘Kazakhstan: Why are there riots and why are Russian troops there?’, 10 January 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-59894266>, accessed 4 October 2022;
Przeworski, A., ‘Formal models of authoritarian regimes: A critique’, Perspectives on Politics (2022), pp. 1–10, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592722002067>;
Welzel, C., Kruse, S. and Brunkert, L., ‘Exchange: Why the future is (still) democratic’, Journal of Democracy, 33/1 (2022), pp. 156–62, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0011>

72.

Akbari, F., ‘The risks facing Hazaras in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan’, Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 7 March 2022, p. 7, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Risks-Facing-Hazaras-in-Taliban-ruled-Afghanistan_Akbari_March-2022.pdf>, accessed 28 October 2022

73.

World Bank, ‘Coping with Shocks: Migration and the Road to Resilience’, 2022, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/38066/FullReport.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y>, accessed 31 October 2022

74.

Abruzzini, B. and Singh, J. M., ‘Offline and online, protests are sweeping across Asia’, The Diplomat, 1 March 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/offline-and-online-protests-are-sweeping-across-asia>, accessed 21 September 2022

75.

Macan-Markar, M., ‘Laos faces public backlash as economy teeters toward default’, Nikkei Asia, 23 June 2022, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Laos-faces-public-backlash-as-economy-teeters-toward-default>, accessed 28 October 2022;
Nishizawa, T., ‘Claims of default in Laos are bankrupt’, East Asia Forum, 25 August 2022, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/08/25/claims-of-default-in-laos-are-bankrupt>, accessed 28 October 2022

76.

Chandran, N., ‘The pandemic has given armies in Southeast Asia a boost’, Foreign Policy, 15 June 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/15/coronavirus-pandemic-army-military-southeast-asia-boost-indonesia-philippines-jokowi-duterte-authoritarianism>, accessed 28 October 2022

77.

Pollock, J. and Symon, D., ‘China’s high-stakes incursion in the heights of Bhutan’, Chatham House, 29 September 2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2022-10/chinas-high-stakes-incursion-heights-bhutan>, accessed 28 October 2022

78.

Morgan, W., ‘Pacific islands are back on the map, and climate action is non-negotiable for would-be allies’, Climate Council, 20 July 2022, <https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/pacific-islands-are-back-on-the-map-and-climate-action-is-non-negotiable-for-would-be-allies>, accessed 15 September 2022

79.

Solod, D., ‘A guide to the violent unrest in Uzbekistan’s Karakalpakstan region’, Open Democracy, 4 August 2022, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/protests-karakalpakstan-uzbekistan-former-soviet>, accessed 28 October 2022

80.

Rickleton, C., ‘Central Asia wrestles with huge influx of Russians fleeing army duty’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 September 2022, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-exodus-central-asia-ukraine-mobilization/32054649.html>, accessed 2 October 2022

81.

Putz, C., ‘Economic resilience in Central Asia amid Russian war in Ukraine’, The Diplomat, 3 October 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/economic-resilience-in-central-asia-amid-russian-war-in-ukraine>, accessed 2 October 2022;
Arystanbek, A. and Schenk, C., ‘Racializing Central Asia during the Russian-Ukrainian War: Migration flows and ethnic hierarchies’, PONARS Eurasia, 9 August 2022, <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/racializing-central-asia-during-the-russian-ukrainian-war-migration-flows-and-ethnic-hierarchies>, accessed 2 October 2022
 

82.

Kenny, E., ‘Sri Lanka’s president and prime minister to resign amidst protests: Democracy in action and challenges ahead’, International IDEA blog, 13 July 2022, <https://www.idea.int/blog/sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-president-and-prime-minister-resign-amidst-protests-democracy-action-and-challenges>, accessed 21 September 2022

83.

Interview with Bhavani Fonseka on Renewing Sri Lanka’s Social Contract, 23 August 2022

84.

Centre for Policy Alternatives, ‘CPA statement on the government’s revised twenty-second amendment to the constitution bill’, 18 August 2022, <https://www.cpalanka.org/cpa-statement-on-the-governments-revised-twenty-second-amendment-to-the-constitution-bill>, accessed 15 September 2022

85.

Interview with Iromi Perera on Renewing Sri Lanka’s Social Contract, 2 September 2022

86.

Uyangoda, J., ‘Taking Aragalaya ideas seriously’, Groundviews, 19 July 2022, <https://groundviews.org/2022/07/19/taking-aragalaya-ideas-seriously>, accessed 15 September 2022

87.

Since 2018, laws that restrict Freedom of Expression online have been passed in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam

88.

Riaz, A., ‘How Bangladesh’s digital security act is creating a culture of fear’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 December 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/09/how-bangladesh-s-digital-security-act-is-creating-culture-of-fear-pub-85951>, accessed 14 September 2022

89.

Nguyen, T., ‘Vietnam’s controversial cybersecurity law spells tough times for activists’, The Diplomat, 4 January 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/vietnams-controversial-cybersecurity-law-spells-tough-times-for-activists>, accessed 14 September 2022

90.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Kyrgyz president signs controversial “false information” bill into law’, 24 August 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-false-information-law/31425483.html>, accessed 14 September 2022

91.

International Commission of Jurists, ‘Singapore: ICJ calls on government to repeal or substantially amend the POFMA, two years after it entered into force’, 4 October 2021, <https://www.icj.org/singapore-icj-calls-on-government-to-repeal-or-substantially-amend-the-pofma-two-years-after-it-entered-into-force>, accessed 14 September 2022

92.

BBC News, ‘India Covid: Anger as Twitter ordered to remove critical virus posts’, 26 April 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56883483>, accessed 14 September 2022

93.

Kenny, E., ‘A campaign of collective amnesia: Presidential elections in the Philippines’, International IDEA blog, 23 May 2022, <https://www.idea.int/blog/campaign-collective-amnesia-presidential-elections-philippines>, accessed
14 September 2022;
Rappler, ‘Patient zero: A study on the Philippine information ecosystem’, 17 February 2022, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/study-information-ecosystem-philippines>, accessed 14 September 2022

94.

Human Rights Watch, ‘Kazakhstan: Protesters arbitrarily arrested, beaten’, 1 February 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/01/kazakhstan-protesters-arbitrarily-arrested-beaten>, accessed 28 October 2022

95.

Anceschi, L., ‘The week that changed Kazakhstan forever’, OpenDemocracy, 6 January 2022, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/the-week-that-changed-kazakhstan-forever>, accessed 28 October 2022;
Human Rights Watch, ‘Kazakhstan: Joint Statement on January 2022 events’, 29 July 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/29/kazakhstan-joint-statement-january-2022-events>, accessed 28 October 2022;
Gotev, G., ‘Kazakh president removes ex-leader Nazarbayev from post amid unrest’, Euractiv, 5 January 2022, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/news/kazakh-president-removes-ex-leader-nazarbayev-from-post-amid-unrest>, accessed 28 October 2022;
Kumenov, A., ‘Kazakhstan voters OK constitutional changes, but meaning illusory to many’, Eurasianet, 6 June 2022, <https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-voters-ok-constitutional-changes-but-meaning-illusory-to-many>, accessed 28 October 2022

96.

Kumenov, A., ‘Kazakhstan: Parliament strips Nazarbayev of lifetime sinecures’, Eurasianet, 2 February 2022, <https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-parliament-strips-nazarbayev-of-lifetime-sinecures>, accessed 28 October 2022

97.

Marat, E., ‘Kazakhstan had huge protests, but no violent crackdown. Here’s why’, The Washington Post, 6 June 2016, 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/06/kazakhstan-had-big-protests-without-a-violent-crackdown-heres-why>, accessed 28 October 2022

98.

Kassymbekova, B. and Marat, E., ‘Kazakhstan can’t torure its way to stability’, Foreign Policy, 16 March 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/16/kazakhstan-torture-tokayev-police-violence-protests>, accessed 28 October 2022

99.

European Union, ‘EP spring 2022 survey: Rallying around the European flag—democracy as anchor point in times of crisis—June 2022—Eurobarometer survey’, June 2022, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2792>, accessed 18 October 2022

100.

Raffray, E., ‘Ukraine: 100 days of war in cyberspace’, CyberPeace Institute, 2 June 2022, <https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/news/ukraine-100-days-of-war-in-cyberspace>, accessed 4 October 2022

101.

BBC News, ‘Belarus crackdown fails to crush opposition spirit’, 7 August 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58114107>, accessed 18 October 2022

102.

Reuters, ‘Europe heading for recession as cost of living crisis deepens’, 5 September 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/europe-heading-recession-cost-living-crisis-deepens-2022-09-05>, accessed 18 October 2022;
World Bank, ‘Stagflation risk rises amid sharp slowdown in growth’, 7 June 2022, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/06/07/stagflation-risk-rises-amid-sharp-slowdown-in-growth-energy-markets>, accessed 14 September 2022

103.

European Investment Bank (EIB), How Bad is the Ukraine War for the European Recovery? (Luxembourg: EIB, 2022), <https://www.eib.org/attachments/publications/how_bad_is_the_ukraine_war_for_the_european_recovery_en.pdf>, accessed 15 September 2022;
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), 2022 ITUC Global Rights Index: The World’s Worst Countries for Workers (Brussels: ITUC, 2022), <https://files.mutualcdn.com/ituc/files/2022-ITUC-Rights-Index-Exec-Summ-EN.pdf>, accessed 15 September 2022

104.

Eurostat, ‘Demography of Europe: Statistics Visualised—2021 Edition’, 2021, <https://www.ine.es/prodyser/demografia_UE/img/pdf/Demograhy-InteractivePublication-2021_en.pdf>, accessed 10 April 2022

105.

European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 96: Public Opinion in the European Union, Infographics, September 2022, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=83476>, accessed 28 October 2022

106.

Coman, J., ‘“Times have changed”: Italian town once run by communists poised to vote far right’, The Guardian,
22 September 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/italy-election-communist-far-right-sesto-san-giovanni>, accessed 4 October 2022

107.

Castillo, A., Huang, C. and Silver, L., ‘In many countries, dissatisfaction with democracy is tied to views about economic conditions, personal rights’, Pew Research Center, 29 April 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/29/in-many-countries-dissatisfaction-with-democracy-is-tied-to-views-about-economic-conditions-personal-rights>, accessed 18 October 2022

108.

European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 96: Public Opinion in the European Union, Annex, April 2022, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=81059>, accessed 28 October 2022

109.

Morlino, L. and Quaranta, M., ‘What is the impact of the economic crisis on democracy? Evidence from Europe’, International Political Science Review, 37/5 (2016), pp. 618– 33, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116639747>

110.

EuroNews, ‘Belgium lowers voting age to 16 for European Parliament elections’, 20 May 2022, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/05/20/belgium-lowers-voting-age-to-16-for-european-parliament-elections>, accessed 15 September 2022

111.

Group of States against Corruption, ‘GRECO urges European governments to increase transparency and accountability of lobbying’, 2 June 2022, <https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/home/newsroom/-/asset_publisher/sCeIUhEJG5bw/content/greco-urges-european-governments-to-increase-transparency-and-accountability-of-lobbying>, accessed 4 October 2022

112.

Participedia, ‘Participatory budgeting in Paris, France’, [n.d.], <https://participedia.net/case/5008>, accessed 4 October 2022
Participedia, ‘Participatory budgeting in Milan: 2015-2016 cycle’, [n.d.], <https://participedia.net/case/4742>, accessed 4 October 2022
Participedia, ‘Permanent sortition in Eupen, Belgium’, [n.d.], <https://participedia.net/case/5770>, accessed 4 October 2022
Participedia, ‘OSALE: Estonia’s eparticipation platform’, [n.d.], <https://participedia.net/case/1268>, accessed 4 October 2022
Participedia, ‘Decide Madrid: Online participatory planning’, [n.d.], <https://participedia.net/case/5726>, accessed 4 October 2022

113.

International IDEA, New Forms of Political Party Membership, Political Party Innovation Primer 5 (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2020.25>

114.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Eight ways to institutionalise deliberative democracy’, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 12 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1787/4fcf1da5-en>

115.

OECD, Database of Representative Deliberative Processes and Institutions, 2021, <https://airtable.com/shrHEM12ogzPs0nQG/tbl1eKbt37N7hVFHF/viwxQgJNyONVHkmS6?blocks=hide>, accessed 15 September 2022

116.

Ibid.

117.

European Union Conference of the Future of Europe, ‘European Citizens’ Panels’, 2022, <https://futureu.europa.eu/assemblies/citizens-panels>, accessed 15 September 2022;
European Union Conference of the Future of Europe, ‘What is the Conference on the Future of Europe?’, <https://futureu.europa.eu/pages/about>, accessed 14 September 2022;
European Union Conference of the Future of Europe, ‘Report on the final outcome’, 9 May 2022, <https://futureu.europa.eu/pages/reporting>, accessed 14 September 2022

118.

European Parliament, ‘Parliament activates process to change EU treaties’, 2022, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220603IPR32122/parliament-activates-process-to-change-eu-treaties>, accessed 14 September 2022;
European Commission, ‘Commission sets out first analysis of the proposals stemming from the Conference on the Future of Europe’, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3750>, accessed 14 September 2022

119.

Dryzek, J. S. et al., ‘The crisis of democracy and the science of deliberation’, Science, 363/6432 (2019), pp. 1144–46, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaw2694>

120.

Chwalisz, C., ‘A movement that’s quietly reshaping democracy for the better’, Noema, 12 May 2022, <https://www.noemamag.com/a-movement-thats-quietly-reshaping-democracy-for-the-better>, accessed 14 September 2022

121.

Bussu, S., ‘Participatory governance—where are we at?’, The Participatory and Deliberative Democracy Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association, 30 August 2022, <https://deliberativehub.wordpress.com/2022/08/30/participatory-governance-where-are-we-at>, accessed 22 September 2022

122.

Landemore, H., ‘No decarbonization without democratization’, Project Syndicate, 26 August 2022, <https://www.project- yndicate.org/onpoint/no-decarbonization-without-democratization-by-helene-landemore-2022-08>, accessed 22 September 2022;
Phalnikar, S., ‘France’s citizen climate assembly: A failed experiment?’, DW, 16 February 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/frances-citizen-climate-assembly-a-failed-experiment/a-56528234>, accessed 15 September 2022;
Faiola, A., ‘Chile’s election is a window into Latin America’s polarization’, The Washington Post, 24 November 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/24/chile-latin-america-polarization-election>, accessed 2 September 2022

123.

BNamericas, ‘Why Latin America’s political polarization is back with a vengeance’, 17 February 2022, <https://www.bnamericas.com/en/interviews/the-unwanted-return-of-extreme-polarization-in-latin-america>, accessed 3 October 2022

124.

Stewart, E., ‘America’s growing fake news problem, in one chart’, Vox, 22 December 2020, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/12/22/22195488/fake-news-social-media-2020>, accessed 2 September 2022;
Open Society Foundations, ‘Latin America’s fake news problem’, 16 April 2018, <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/latin-americas-fake-news-problem>, accessed 2 September 2022

125.

Totenberg, N. and Mccamon, S., ‘Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade, ending right to abortion upheld for decades’, NPR, 24 June 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/06/24/1102305878/supreme-court-abortion-roe-v-wade-decision-overturn>, accessed 2 September 2022

126.

Global Witness, ‘Annual report 2021: Our case for change’, 17 August 2022, <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/about-us/annual-report-2021-our-case-change>, accessed 3 October 2022

127.

Human Rights Watch, ‘Latin America: Alarming reversal of basic freedoms: Judicial independence, free press, civil society under attack; humanitarian needs rising’, 13 January 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/13/latin-america-alarming-reversal-basic-freedoms>, accessed 2 September 2022

128.

Swissinfo, ‘Elecciones hondureñas, buena noticia para Centroamérica, dice jefe misión OEA’ [Honduran elections good news for Central America, says OAS mission chief], 1 December 2021, <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/honduras-elecciones_elecciones-hondure%C3%B1as–buena-noticia-para-centroam%C3%A9rica–dice-jefe-misi%C3%B3n-oea/47155438>, accessed 19 October 2022

129.

BBC News Mundo, ‘Elecciones en Honduras: el candidato oficialista Nasry Asfura reconoce la derrota y felicita personalmente a la izquierdista Xiomara Castro’ [Honduran elections: Pro-government candidate Nasry Asfura concedes defeat and personally congratulates leftist Xiomara Castro], 1 December 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-59486276>, accessed 2 September 2022

130.

BBC News Mundo, ‘Prisión preventiva para Jeanine Áñez en Bolivia: qué es el caso « golpe de Estado » y por qué genera controversia en el país’ [Pre-trial detention for Jeanine Áñez in Bolivia: What is the ‘coup d’état’ case and why does it generate controversy in the country], 15 March 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-56389150>, accessed 19 September 2022;
Molina, F., ‘Un juez prolonga seis meses la detención de la expresidenta de Bolivia Jeanine Añez’ [Judge extends detention of former Bolivian President Jeanine Añez for six months], El País, 4 August 2021, <https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-08-04/un-juez-prolonga-seis-meses-la-detencion-de-la-expresidenta-de-bolivia-jeanine-anez.html>, accessed 19 September 2022;
Los Tiempos, ‘Diputado del MAS inicia proceso penal a Salvador Romero por incumplimiento de deberes’ [MAS deputy initiates criminal proceedings against Salvador Romero for breach of duty], 1 May 2021, <https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20210501/diputado-del-mas-inicia-proceso-penal-salvador-romero-incumplimiento>, accessed 19 September 2022

131.

Arroyo, L. and Laborde, A., ‘Washington, la capital de la justicia guatemalteca en el exilio’ [Washington, the capital of Guatemalan justice in exile], El País, 16 August 2021, <https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-08-16/washington-la-capital-de-la-justicia-guatemalteca-en-el-exilio.html>, accessed 19 September 2022

132.

Deutsche Welle, ‘Guatemala: al menos 13 exfiscales se encuentran en el exilio’ [Guatemala: At least 13 ex-prosecutors in exile], 17 February 2022, <https://www.dw.com/es/guatemala-al-menos-13-exfiscales-se-encuentran-en-el-exilio/a-60807873>, accessed 19 September 2022

133.

Sabatini, C. and Wallace, J., ‘Democracy in Brazil’, Chatham House, 17 August 2022, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/08/democracy-brazil>, accessed 2 September 2022;
Stuenkel, O., ‘Brazil’s polarization and democratic risks’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 February 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/02/17/brazil-s-polarization-and-democratic-risks-pub-83783>, accessed 2 September 2022

134.

Boadle, A., ‘Bolsonaro attacks Brazil’s election system in briefing for diplomats’, Reuters, 19 July 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolsonaro-share-concerns-about-brazil-election-with-diplomats-2022-07-18>, accessed 2 September 2022

135.

Kamarck, E., ‘Did Trump damage American democracy?’, Brookings Institution, 9 July 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/07/09/did-trump-damage-american-democracy>, accessed 2 September 2022;
Gearan, A. and Dawsey, J., ‘Trump issued a call to arms. Then he urged his followers “to remember this day forever!”’, The Washington Post, 6 January 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election- capitol-building/2021/01/06/3e9af194-5031-11eb-bda4-615aaefd0555_story.html>, accessed 2 September 2022

136.

Totenberg, N. and Mccamon, S., ‘Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade, ending right to abortion upheld for decades’, NPR, 24 June 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/06/24/1102305878/supreme-court-abortion-roe-v-wade-decision-overturn>, accessed 2 September 2022

137.

International IDEA, El Estado de la Democracia en las Américas 2021: Democracia en tiempos de crisis [The State of Democracy in the Americas 2021: Democracy in Times of Crisis] (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2021.92>

138.

Ibid.

139.

Human Rights Watch, ‘El Salvador: Evidence of serious abuse in state of emergency’, 2 May 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/02/el-salvador-evidence-serious-abuse-state-emergency>, accessed 18 October 2022

140.

Amnesty International, ‘El Salvador: El presidente Bukele sumerge al país en una crisis de Derechos Humanos luego de tres años de gobierno’ [El Salvador: President Bukele plunges the country into a human rights crisis after three years in office], 2 June 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2022/06/el-salvador-president-bukele-human-rights-crisis>, accessed 18 October 2022

141.

BBC News, ‘Nicaragua: Police raid offices of La Prensa newspaper’, 14 August 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-58212024>, accessed 2 September 2022

142.

Lopez, O., ‘In widening crackdown, renowned journalist arrested in Guatemala’, The New York Times, 30 July 2022,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/30/world/americas/guatemala-journalist-zamora-arrest.html>, accessed
2 September 2022

143.

The Washington Post, ‘As journalists face deadly violence, Mexico’s president attacks the media’, 15 February 2022,
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/15/mexico-journalists-attacks-amlo-carlos-loret-de-mola-pressfreedom>, accessed 2 September 2022

144.

Reporters Without Borders, ‘Barometer—World: abuses in real time’, 2022, <https://rsf.org/en/barometer>, accessed
3 October 2022

145.

Kyle, J. and Mounk, Y., ‘The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment’, Tony Blair Institute for Global
Change, 2018, <https://institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-EmpiricalAssessment.pdf>, accessed 2 September 2022

146.

Marcial Pérez, D., ‘López Obrador redobla los ataques al INE en vísperas de la consulta sobre los expresidentes’
[López Obrador doubles down on attacks on INE on eve of consultation on former presidents], El País, 24 July 2021,
<https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-07-23/lopez-obradorredobla-los-ataques-al-ine-en-visperas-de-la-consulta-sobrelos-expresidentes.html>, accessed 2 September 2022

147.

Etcétera, ‘Morena asalta al Instituto Electoral de la Ciudad de México’ [Morena assaults Mexico City’s Electoral Institute], 27 May 2022, <https://www.etcetera.com.mx/sin-categoria/morena-instituto-electoral-ciudad-mexico>, accessed 3 October 2022;
Yared, D. L. R., ‘Órganos electorales de estados donde gobierna Morena padecen crisis presupuestales’ [Electoral bodies in states where Morena governs suffer budget crisis], Forbes Mexico, 26 September 2022, <https://www.forbes.com.mx/organos-electorales-de-estados-donde-gobierna-morena-padecen-crisis-presupuestales>, accessed 19 October 2022;
Benitez, D., ‘AMLO usó la consulta de revocación de mandato para atacar a INE: misión internacional’ [AMLO used the recall referendum to attack INE: international mission], El Financiero, 26 April 2022, <https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2022/04/26/amlo-uso-consulta-para-atacar-a-ine-mision-internacional>, accessed 19 October 2022

148.

Boadle, A., ‘Bolsonaro attacks Brazil’s election system in briefing for diplomats’, Reuters, 19 July 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolsonaro-share-concerns-about-brazil-election-with-diplomats-2022-07-18>, accessed 2 September 2022; 
Preissler Iglesias, S. and Wanzeller, M., ‘Bolsonaro accuses Brazil electoral court of stealing votes’, Bloomberg,
9 July 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-09/bolsonaro-accuses-brazilian-electoral-court-of-stealing-votes>, accessed 2 September 2022;
Milhorance, F. and Londoño, E., ‘Bolsonaro prompts fears of a power grab with attacks on Brazil’s voting system’, The New York Times, 10 August 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/10/world/americas/brazil-vote-bolsonaro.html>, accessed 2 September 2022

149.

Wolf, Z. B., ‘The 5 key elements of Trump’s Big Lie and how it came to be’, CNN Politics, 19 May 2021, <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/05/19/politics/donald-trump-big-lie-explainer/index.html>, accessed 18 October 2022

150.

El Peruano, ‘JNE y ONPE emiten comunicado conjunto: Rechazan versión de supuesto fraude—Entidades electorales exigen se presenten pruebas’ [JNE and ONPE issue joint communique: They reject version of alleged fraud—electoral entities demand evidence to be presented], 13 May 2022, <https://www.elperuano.pe/noticia/153197-rechazan-version-de-supuesto-fraude>, accessed 19 October 2022

151.

OSCE/ODIHR, ‘Highly competitive elections in US tarnished by legal uncertainty and unprecedented attempts to undermine public trust, international observers say’, Press release, 4 November 2020, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa/469440>, accessed 2 September 2022;
Peck, G., ‘Election watchdog says no credible proof of Myanmar fraud’, Associated Press, 17 May 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-religion-elections-health-coronavirus-pandemic-bd8bf157e3404c77c4f9a85f41dc7ae1>, accessed 2 September 2022;
Gearan, A. and Dawsey, J., ‘Trump issued a call to arms. Then he urged his followers “to remember this day forever!”’, The Washington Post, 6 January 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-election-capitol-building/2021/01/06/3e9af194-5031-11eb-bda4-615aaefd0555_story.html> accessed 2 September 2022

152.

Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, signed at Escazu, 4 March 2018, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-18&chapter=27&clang=_en>, accessed 5 October 2022

153.

Swissinfo, ‘Honduras necesita adherirse “lo mas pronto” al Acuerdo de Escazu’ [Honduras needs to accede to the Escazu Agreement ‘as soon as possible’], 25 August 2022, <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/honduras-medioambiente_honduras-necesita-adherirse–lo-m%C3%A1s-pronto–al-acuerdo-de-escaz%C3%BA/47853602#:~:text=%2D%20 El%20Comit%C3%A9%20Nacional%20de%20la,la%20prot-ecci%C3%B3n%20de%20los%20ambientalistas.>, accessed 28 October 2022

154.

Honduran Human Rights Ministry, ‘Berta Caceres, heroina por su lucha en la defensa de los derechos humanos, los pueblos indígenas y el medioambiente’ [Berta Caceres, hero for her work in defence of human rights, Indigenous peoples and the environment], 26 May 2022, <https://www.sedh.gob.hn/noticias3/1218-berta-caceres-heroina-por-su-lucha-en-la-defensa-de-los-derechos-humanos-los-pueblos-indigenas-y-el-medioambiente>, accessed 14 September 2022

155.

Perdomo, M., ‘Gobierno de Xiomara Castro esquiva adhesión de Acuerdo de Escazu’ [Xiomara Castro’s government sidesteps accession to the Escazu Agreement], 9 September 2022, <https://criterio.hn/gobierno-de-xiomara-castro-esquiva-adhesion-de-acuerdo-de-escazu>, accessed 15 September 2022

156.

France 24, ‘Honduras endurece prohibicion del aborto con reforma constitucional’ [Honduras doubles down on prohibition of abortion with constitutional amendment], 22 January 2021, <https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20210122-honduras-endurece-prohibici%C3%B3n-del-aborto-con-reforma-constitucional>, accessed 15 September 2022

157.

Somos Muchas, ‘Honduras admite recurso por el aborto en tres causales’ [Honduras admits appeal for abortion in three cases], 13 July 2021, <https://somosmuchas.hn/victoria-por-el-derecho-a-decidir>, accessed 15 September 2022

158.

La Tribuna, ‘Presentan “amicus curiae” en respaldo contra el aborto’ [‘Amicus curiae’ presented in backing against abortion], 18 May 2022, <https://www.latribuna.hn/2022/05/18/presentan-amicus-curiae-en-respaldo-contra-el-aborto>, accessed 15 September 2022

159.

EFE, ‘Los LGBTI en Honduras reclaman igualdad de trato en el día contra la homofobia’ [LGBTI in Honduras demand equal treatment against homophobia], 18 May 2022, <https://www.efe.com/efe/america/sociedad/los-lgbti-en-honduras-reclaman-igualdad-de-trato-el-dia-contra-la-homofobia/20000013-4808131>, accessed 15 September 2022

160.

El País, ‘Honduras reconoce su responsabilidad en la muerte de Vicky Hernandez, una mujer transgénero’ [Honduras admits responsibility in the death of Vicky Hernandez, a transgender woman], 9 May 2022, <https://elpais.com/internacional/2022-05-09/honduras-reconoce-su-responsabilidad-en-la-muerte-de-vicky-hernandez-una-mujer-transgenero.html>, accessed 15 September 2022

161.

Kurmanaev, A., ‘Xiomara Castro lidera en Honduras con una promesa de cambio a pesar de sus vínculos con el pasado’ [Xiomara Castro leads in Honduras with a promise for change, despite her ties to the past], The New York Times, 29 November 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2021/11/29/espanol/xiomara-castro-honduras.html>, accessed 15 September 2022

162.

Palomino, S., ‘Los retos feministas de Xiomara Castro, la primera presidenta de Honduras’ [The feminist challenges of Xiomara Castro, the first woman president of Honduras], El País, 3 December 2021, <https://elpais.com/sociedad/2021-12-03/los-retos-feministas-de-xiomara-castro-la-primera-presidenta-de-honduras.html>, accessed 15 September 2022

163.

UNDP, ‘Trapped: High inequality and low growth in Latin America and the Caribbean’, Regional Human Development Report 2021, <https://www.undp.org/latin-america/publications/regional-human-development-report-2021-trapped-high-inequality-and-low-growth-latin-america-and-caribbean>, accessed 2 September 2022

164.

CAF, ‘5 datos sobre pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe’ [5 facts about poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean], 6 April 2022, <https://www.caf.com/es/actualidad/noticias/2022/04/5-datos-sobre-pobreza-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe>, accessed 2 September 2022

165.

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), ‘Latin America and the Caribbean: Time for reforms to address long-standing challenges, says new report’, 2 December 2021, <https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/latin-america-and-caribbean-time-reforms-address-long-standing-challenges-says-newhttps://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/latin-america-and-caribbean-time-reforms-address-long-standing-challenges-says-new>, accessed 2 September 2022

166.

International Labour Organization, ‘Employment and Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean: An Insufficient and Unequal Recovery’, September 2021, <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—americas/—ro-lima/—sro-port_of_spain/documents/genericdocument/wcms_819029.pdf>, accessed 19 October 2022

167.

F. Ohnsorge and S. Yu (eds), The Long Shadow of Informality: Challenges and Policies (Washington DC: World Bank, 2021), <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/37511318c092e6fd4ca3c60f0af0bea3-0350012021/related/Informal-economy-full-report.pdf>, accessed 19 October 2022

168.

Alfers, L., Chen, M. and Plagerson, S., Social Contracts and Informal Workers in the Global South (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839108068>

169.

ECLAC, ‘Social panorama of Latin America 2019’, 2019, <https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/44989-social-panorama-latin-america-2019>, accessed 2 September 2022

170.

Barría, C., ‘Desigualdad en América Latina: los países en los que más ha disminuido (y la paradoja del que más la ha reducido)’ [Inequality in Latin America: The countries in which it has decreased the most (and the paradox of the one that has reduced it the most)], BBC News Mundo, 15 November 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-50255301>, 17 May 2022

171.

Latin America and the Caribbean’s health expenditure amounts to only 7.96 per cent of GDP, well below the global average. World Bank, ‘Current health expenditure (% of GDP)’, 2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS>, accessed 18 October 2022

172.

Clark, D. and Regan, P., ‘Mass mobilization protest data’, Harvard Dataverse, V5, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HTTWYL>

173.

Tankersley, J., ‘Biden signs climate, health bill into law as other economic goals remain’, The New York Times, 16 August 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/16/us/politics/biden-climate-health-bill.html>, accessed
22 September 2022

174.

Otaola, M. A. L., ‘Urnas y descontento en América Latina’ [Ballot boxes and discontent in Latin America], International IDEA blog, 26 July 2022, <https://www.idea.int/es/blog/urnas-y-descontento-en-am%C3%A9rica-latina>, accessed 5 October 2022

175.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Chile’s constitutional process: An historic opportunity to enshrine human rights’, 8 June 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2022/06/chiles-constitutional-process-historic-opportunity-enshrine-human-rights>, accessed 2 September 2022

176.

Rivas Molina, F. and Montes, R., ‘Chile rechaza rotundamente la nueva constitucion’ [Chile overwhelmingly rejects the new constitution], El País, 4 September 2022, <https://elpais.com/chile/2022-09-05/chile-rechaza-rotundamente-la-nueva-constitucion.html>, accessed 7 September 2022

177.

Lankes, A., ‘The contentious vote in Chile that could transform Indigenous rights’, The New York Times,
2 September 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/02/world/americas/chile-constitution-vote-indigenous.html>, accessed 17 October 2022

178.

Rivas Molina, F. and Montes R., ‘Gabriel Boric prepara un nuevo proceso constituyente para Chile’ [Gabriel
Boric prepares a new constitution-building process for Chile], El País, 5 September 2022, <https://elpais.com/chile/2022-09-05/gabriel-boric-prepara-un-nuevo-proceso-constituyente-para-chile.html>, accessed 14 September 2022

179.

Rivas Molina, F. and Montes, R., ‘Boric sacrifica a su circulo intimo en el Gabinete y se abre al centroizquierda tradicional [Boric sacrifices his Cabinet’s inner circle and opens to the traditional centre/left], El País, 6 September 2022, <https://elpais.com/chile/2022-09-06/boric-alista-un-cambio-de-ministros-a-menos-de-48-horas-de-la-derrota-en-el-plebiscito-constitucional.html>, accessed 14 September 2022

180.

Boric, G., ‘Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly’, 20 September 2022, <https://prensa.presidencia.cl/comunicado.aspx?id=201143>, accessed 22 September 2022

181.

Davenport, C., ‘Protesters amass at White House, demanding action on climate’, The New York Times, 23 April 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/23/climate/climate-change-rally-white-house.html>, accessed 15 September 2022

182.

Tankersley, J., ‘Biden signs climate, health bill into law as other economic goals remain’, The New York Times,
16 August 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/16/us/politics/biden-climate-health-bill.html>, accessed 22 September 2022

183.

Telford, T., ‘Biden wants to let gig workers be employees. Here’s why it matters’, The Washington Post, 17 October 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/10/17/gig-workers-contractors-faq>, accessed 19 October 2022

184.

Iqbal, N., ‘Kansas abortion vote: Major victory for pro-choice groups’, BBC News, 3 August 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-62402625>, accessed 19 October 2022

185.

Turkewitz, J, ‘Colombia decriminalizes abortion, bolstering trend across region’, The New York Times, 22 February 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/world/americas/colombia-abortion.html>, accessed 14 September 2022

186.

Salinas, C., ‘Guatemala endurece su legislación contra el aborto y declara a la comunidad LGBTI “incongruente con la moral cristiana”’ [Guatemala strengthens its anti-abortion legislation and declares the LGBTI community as ‘incongruent with Christian morality’], 10 March 2022, <https://elpais.com/internacional/2022-03-10/guatemala-endurece-su-legislacion-contra-el-aborto-y-declara-a-la-comunidad-lgbti-incongruente-con-la-moral-cristiana.html>, accessed 5 October 2022

187.

BBC News Mundo, ‘Condenan a 30 años de prisión en El Salvador a una mujer por un “aborto involuntario”’ [30 years prison sentence in El Salvador for a woman who had an ‘involuntary abortion’], 10 May 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-61401436>, accessed 15 September 2022

188.

YWCA Canada, ‘A Feminist Recovery Plan for Canada’, 2021, <https://www.feministrecovery.ca>, accessed 18 October 2022

189.

Casas Zamora, K. and Lara Otaola, M. A., ‘¿La democracia cura?’ [Does democracy cure?], Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 21/3 (2021)

190.

Team, A. C., ‘Indigenous women achieve “Mamakunapa” Civil Society Nature Reserve’, Amazon Conservation Team, 2020, <https://www.amazonteam.org/indigenous-women-achieve-mamakunapa-civil-society-nature-reserve>, accessed 16 October 2022.

191.

World Bank, ‘Childcare for garment factory parents is investment in human capital’, 5 March 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/03/05/childcare-for-garment-factory-parents-is-investment-in-human-capital>, accessed 16 October 2022

192.

Munthali, A., ‘The need to invest in community-based childcare centres’, UNICEF, 13 September 2022, <https://www.unicef.org/malawi/stories/need-invest-community-based-childcare-centres>, accessed 16 October 2022

193.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Nicaragua must restore full enjoyment of civil and political rights, particularly freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, media and civic assembly: UN and IACHR experts’, 3 October 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/nicaragua-must-restore-full-enjoyment-civil-and-political-rights>, accessed 21 October 2022

194.

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Four years on, IACHR presents an assessment of the activities held by its special monitoring mechanism for Nicaragua and the results they attained’, 29 August 2022, <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2022/189.asp>, accessed 24 October 2022

195.

Arab EMBs, [n.d.], <https://www.arabembs.org>, accessed 19 October 2022

196.

CIVICUS, People Power under Attack 2021: A Report Based on Data from the CIVICUS Monitor, 2021, <https://civicus.contentfiles.net/media/assets/file/2021GlobalReport.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2022

197.

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, ‘Results-based management’, [n.d.], <https://www.sida.se/en/for-partners/partnership-with-sida/results-based-management>, accessed 19 October 2022;
Eldén, Å. and Levin, P. T., Swedish Aid in the Era of Shrinking Space—the Case of Turkey, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys, 2018, <https://eba.se/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018-06-Shrinking-Space_webb_Tillganp.pdf>, accessed 28 October 2022

198.

International IDEA, ‘Electoral training and education: The case of the Information and Electoral Education Unit, ONPE Peru’, Case Study, 27 May 2021, <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/multimedia_reports/electoral-training-and-education-the-case-of-the-information-and-electoral-education-unit-onpe-peru_en.pdf>, accessed 28 October 2022

199.

Instituto Nacional Electoral, ‘Estrategia Nacional de Cultura Cívica 2017-2023’ [National Civic Culture Strategy], 2016, <https://portalanterior.ine.mx/archivos2/portal/historico/contenido/recursos/IFE-v2/DECEYEC/DECEYEC-Varios/2016/ENCCIVICA-14-10-2016.pdf>, accessed 21 October 2022

200.

Agencia de Noticias Panama, ‘Lanzan pacto etico digital para las elecciones’ [Ethical digital pact is launched], 26 June 2018, <https://www.anpanama.com/8268-Lanzan-Pacto-Etico-Digital-para-las-elecciones.note.aspx>, accessed 21 October 2022

201.

International IDEA, Electoral Management Design: Revised Edition (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014), <https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-management-design-revised-edition>, accessed 21 October 2022

202.

Instituto Nacional Electoral, ‘Summit for electoral democracy’, 13 May 2022, <https://www.ine.mx/summit-for-electoral-democracy>, accessed 21 October 2022

203.

Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, « Rapporteur spécial sur l’indépendance des juges et des avocats », [nd], < https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-independence-of- juges-et-avocats >, consulté le 21 octobre 2022204.

Idem.

1 réponse »

Votre commentaire

Entrez vos coordonnées ci-dessous ou cliquez sur une icône pour vous connecter:

Logo WordPress.com

Vous commentez à l’aide de votre compte WordPress.com. Déconnexion /  Changer )

Image Twitter

Vous commentez à l’aide de votre compte Twitter. Déconnexion /  Changer )

Photo Facebook

Vous commentez à l’aide de votre compte Facebook. Déconnexion /  Changer )

Connexion à %s

Ce site utilise Akismet pour réduire les indésirables. En savoir plus sur la façon dont les données de vos commentaires sont traitées.

%d blogueurs aiment cette page :